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JUSTICE OF THE PEACE?:
WHY FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
404(A)(2)(C) SHOULD BE REPEALED'
COLIN MILLER"

FederalRule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C) and its state counterparts
are the one exception to the general "Pandora'sBox" theory
regarding the admissibility of propensity character evidence in
criminal cases. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2),
sometimes dubbed the "mercy rule," propensity character
evidence is generally inadmissiblein any criminal trial unless the
defendant decides to inject character evidence into the trial by
presenting evidence of his good character under Rule
404(a) (2) (A) and/or evidence of the victim's bad characterunder
Rule 404(a) (2) (B). Choosing to do so, however, opens the
proverbial Pandora'sBox because it allows for the prosecution
to respond in kind by presenting evidence of the defendant's bad
characterand/or the victim's good character.
This Article argues that the same reasoningthat has been used to
justify Rule 404(a) (2) as a whole is directly at odds with the
authorization given to the prosecution under Rule 404(a)(2)(C)
to present evidence of the alleged victim's peacefulness in a
homicide case in which the defendant claims that the victim was
in fact the first aggressorbut does not attack the victim's general
character for violence. Moreover, Rule 404(a) (2)(C) is
antithetical to our evidentiary and constitutionalframework that
almost always treats criminal defendants at least as well as, and
usually better than, their civil counterparts. Instead, the Rule
places a criminal defendant who claims that he acted in selfdefense in response to initial aggression by the alleged victim in a
no-win situation in which he must open the door to the
admission of propensity characterevidence or forgo his best and
maybe his only defense. Accordingly, Rule 404(a)(2) (C) and
state counterpartsshould be repealed.

@ 2013 Colin Miller.
Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Blog Editor,
EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/.
*
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INTRODUCTION

In Commonwealth v. Bedford,' Duane Bedford performed some
construction work for his neighbor, Sam Brown, until a dispute arose
between the two men before the job was completed.' That dispute
escalated when Brown suspected that Bedford smashed his car
windows.' Brown went to confront Bedford, with that confrontation
ending with Bedford shooting Brown three times, causing Brown's
death.' Bedford subsequently went incognito, leading to a year-long
search for him, an appearance on America's Most Wanted, and,
ultimately, his apprehension.'
Charged with first-degree murder, Bedford claimed self-defense
and specifically that Brown was the first aggressor who came looking
for him "with hardness of heart."' Notably, Bedford did not present
any propensity character evidence tending to show that he was
generally a peaceful person or that Brown had generally been a

1. 50 A.3d 707, appeal denied, 57 A.3d 65 (Pa. 2012).
2. Id. at 709-10.
3. See id. at 710.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 711. The phrase "hardness of heart" is one that courts often use in
describing the state of mind of a murderer. See Nancy Cook, A Few Words About Women
in the Discourseof Criminal Law upon Reading Martha Grace Duncan's Essay, Beauty in
the Dark of Night, 59 EMORY L.J. 1245, 1247 (2010).
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violent person.7 Bedford simply claimed that Brown attacked him
first in the encounter that ended with Brown's death.'
In response to this defense, the Commonwealth called Sergeant
Sean Butts as a character witness, leading, inter alia, to the following
exchange:
[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Do you know [Victim] to be a
violent individual?
[SGT. BUTTS]: No.
[THE COMMONWEALTH]: [Why] do you say "no"?
[SGT. BUTTS]: [Victim] was a very soft-spoken, meek person,
very subdued. Never really raised his voice around me or in
public. There have been some instances at his employment
where he could have gotten upset or violent, but he didn't.'
After Bedford was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, he appealed, claiming that Sergeant Butts's
testimony was improperly admitted. 0 Bedford's claim, however, was
not that evidence concerning Brown's character was generally
inadmissible; instead, he merely (and unsuccessfully) objected to the
form of Sergeant Butts's testimony." This makes sense because
challenging the content of the testimony would almost certainly have
been fruitless. Like Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C),
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(ii) clearly allows for the
admission of evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness when
the defendant in a homicide case claims that the victim was the first
aggressor, even if the defendant presents no character evidence
concerning the victim.' 2 Moreover, these rules are not a modern
creation. Instead, the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying the
original enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 404 in 1975 makes it
clear that evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness under
such circumstances was admitted "[i]n most jurisdictions today.""
7. See Bedford, 50 A.3d at 714.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 715.
10. See id. at 710, 713.
11. See id. at 5 ("In Appellant's third issue, he objects to the form of character
testimony offered by Sgt. Sean Butts .... ").
12. See PA. R. EvID. 404(a)(2)(ii) ("In a homicide case, where the accused has offered
evidence that the deceased was the first aggressor, evidence of a character trait of the
deceased for peacefulness is admissible when offered by the prosecution to rebut the same
13. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C) and its state counterparts
are thus the only exceptions to the general "Pandora's Box" theory
regarding the admissibility of propensity character evidence in
criminal cases.' 4 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2),
sometimes dubbed the "mercy rule,"" propensity character evidence
is generally inadmissible in any criminal trial unless the defendant
decides to inject character evidence into the trial by presenting
evidence of his good character under Rule 404(a)(2)(A) and/or
evidence of the victim's bad character under Rule 404(a)(2)(B).16
Choosing to do so, however, opens the proverbial Pandora's Box
because it allows for the prosecution to respond in kind by presenting
evidence of the defendant's bad character and/or the victim's good
character. 17
This Article argues that the same reasoning that has been used to
justify Rule 404(a)(2) as a whole is directly at odds with the
authorization given to the prosecution under Rule 404(a)(2)(C) to
present evidence of the alleged victim's peacefulness in a homicide
case in which the defendant claims that the victim was in fact the first
aggressor but does not attack the victim's general character for
violence. Moreover, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is antithetical to our
evidentiary and constitutional framework that almost always treats
criminal defendants at least as well as, and usually better than, their
civil counterparts. Instead, the Rule places a criminal defendant who
claims that he acted in self-defense in response to initial aggression by
the alleged victim in a no-win situation in which he must open the
door to the admission of propensity character evidence or forgo his
best and maybe his only defense. Accordingly, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) and
state counterparts should be repealed.
Part I of this Article addresses Federal Rule of Evidence 404 and
the explanations given by the Advisory Committee for the inclusion
of the mercy rule. Part II discusses the later decision to limit the
mercy rule to criminal cases and preclude its application in civil cases
that are quasi-criminal in nature (e.g., wrongful death cases). It notes
14. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Celaya v. Stewart, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1056 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2010) ("The
so-called 'mercy rule' permits a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of pertinent
character traits of the victim because the accused, whose liberty is at stake, may need 'a
counterweight against the strong investigative and prosecutorial resources of the
government.' " (quoting Belardo v. Virgin Islands, No. CRIM.A. 2006/023, 2009 WL
1106937 (D.V.I. Apr. 22, 2009), affd, 385 F. App'x 149 (3d Cir. 2010))), aff'd sub nom.
Celaya v. Ryan, No. 10-15935, 2012 WL 5505736 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2012).
16. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A)-(B).
17. See id.
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how this decision was based upon the recognition that both the stakes
and the power and resource imbalance can be significantly higher in a
criminal case, with the mercy rule partially allowing criminal
defendants to level the playing field. This Part argues that Rule
404(a)(2)(C) is directly antithetical to this rationale and that it should
be abolished unless there is some alternate rationale for its existence.
The rest of the Part then considers and rejects forfeiture, waiver, and
evidentiary need as alternate justifications for the Rule. Finally, Part
III discusses how Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is inconsistent with the rest of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which almost always treat criminal
defendants the same as, and usually better than, civil defendants.
I. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404, PROPENSITY CHARACTER
EVIDENCE, AND THE "MERCY RULE"

A Definition of Propensity CharacterEvidence
Propensity character evidence is "evidence of a person's
character or trait of character to prove that he has a propensity to act
in a specific manner and thus that he likely acted in conformity with
that propensity at the time of an alleged pre-trial wrong."" More
simply, it is evidence whose probative value is dependent on the
aphorism, "Once a criminal, always a criminal."" For instance, in the
Bedford case from the Introduction, if Bedford, the homicide
defendant, had committed a prior murder, the prosecution might
have wanted to present evidence of this prior crime as propensity
character evidence to prove, "Once a murderer, always a murderer."'
Alternately, the prosecution might have wanted to call Bedford's
neighbors to testify that they thought Bedford to be a generally
violent person to prove, "Once a violent thug, always a violent

A.

thug."21

18. Colin Miller, Impeachable Offenses?: Why Civil Parties in Quasi-Criminal Cases
Should Be Treated Like Criminal Defendants Under the Felony Impeachment Rule, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2009).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Mare, 668 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir.) ("The concern is that,
upon learning of that prior conduct, the jury might think worse of the defendant's
character out of some 'rel[iance] on the aphorism "once a criminal, always a criminal." ' "
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rubio-Estreada, 857 F.2d 845, 852 (1st
Cir. 1988) (Torruella, J., dissenting))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2758 (2012).
20. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, Characterand Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 439, 527 (2001) (" 'Once a murderer, always a murderer' is precisely the type of
reasoning forbidden by the character rule.").
21. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) ("The State may not
show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his
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The General Inadmissibilityof Propensity CharacterEvidence
Propensity character evidence, however, is generally inadmissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1), which simply states that
"[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible
to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character or trait."22 There are three main reasons why Rule
404(a)(1) and state counterparts deem propensity character evidence
generally inadmissible:
B.

First, there is a concern that a jury will convict a defendant as a
means of punishment for past deeds or merely because the jury
views the defendant as undesirable....

Second, there is a

"possibility that a jury will overvalue the character evidence in
assessing the guilt for the crime charged." . . . Third, it is unfair

to require a defendant to defend not only against the crime
charged, but moreover, to disprove the prior acts or explain his
or her personality.23
C.

The CharacterEvidence "Mercy Rule" for Criminal Trials
But let's say that it was Bedford who wanted to call neighbors to
testify that (a) they thought that Bedford was a generally peaceful
person and/or (b) they thought that Brown, his victim, was a generally
violent person. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2), the socalled "mercy rule," Bedford would have been able to have the
neighbors offer their opinions of both individuals involved in the fatal
shooting. First, Rule 404(a)(2)(A) provides that in any criminal case
"a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait,
and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it."2 4 Second, Rule 404(a)(2)(B) provides that in any criminal
case,
subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer
evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the
evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may:
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and

neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a
probable perpetrator of the crime.").
22. FED. R. EviD. 404(a).

23. Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542, 552 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Masters v. People, 58
P.3d 979, 995 (Colo. 2002)).
24. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2)(A).
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(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait ....
In other words, Rule 404(a)(2) works like Pandora's Box. If a
criminal defendant wants to prevent propensity character evidence
from infecting his trial, he merely needs to refrain from presenting
any propensity character evidence on his own behalf.' The defendant
can, however, choose to present evidence of his good character for a
pertinent character trait, which then opens the door for the
prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character
for the same trait.27 Moreover, the defendant can choose to present
evidence of the victim's bad character for a pertinent character trait,
which then opens the door for the prosecution to present not only
evidence of the victim's good character for the same trait but also
evidence of the defendant's bad character for the same trait.28
Then there is Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C), the federal
counterpart to the Pennsylvania rule applied at Bedford's trial. Rule
404(a)(2)(C) provides that "in a homicide case, the prosecutor may
offer evidence of the alleged victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor." 9 Therefore, even if
a defendant like Bedford merely presents evidence that the victim
was the first aggressor in the case at hand and does not present
evidence that the victim generally had a character for being violent,
the prosecution can present evidence concerning the victim's general
character for peacefulness.3 0
As in Bedford, the defendant in United States v. Weise3 1 was
charged with murder. 32 The murder in Weise occurred after a night of
heavy drinking, with Simon Weise fatally stabbing Alan Maxwell
twice in the chest with an eight-inch butcher knife." Like Bedford,
Weise claimed self-defense and alleged that his victim was the first
aggressor but did not present any evidence concerning his victim's
character for violence.34 The prosecution's response was to call
Maxwell's brother as well as "several other witnesses to testify about
25. Id. 404(a)(2)(B).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character or character trait
is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character or trait.").
27. See id. 404(a)(2)(A).
28. See id. 404(a)(2)(B).
29. Id. 404(a)(2)(C).
30. See id.
31. 89 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1996).
32. Id. at 504.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Maxwell's peaceful character."" In rejecting Weise's appeal from his
murder conviction, the Eighth Circuit quickly concluded that under
Rule 404(a)(2)(C) "[t]he Government properly offered this testimony
to rebut Weise's claim that Maxwell was the aggressor."36
Like Pennsylvania, most states have counterparts to Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C) and similarly admit evidence of the
victim's character for peacefulness when the defendant claims that the
victim was the first aggressor but does not attack his general character
for violence." For instance, in Goff v. State," the Court of Appeals of
Mississippi found no problem with testimony by character witnesses
that the victim "wouldn't harm a fly," "never really bothered
anybody," and "was a kind, gentle man" because a homicide
defendant alleged that the victim struck him first."
D.

The Rationalesfor the "Mercy Rule" and Rule 404(a) (2) (C)
What accounts for the three exceptions to the general
proscription on the admissibility of propensity character evidence
contained in Rules 404(a)(2)(A)-(C)? According to the Advisory
Committee's Note accompanying the original version of Rule 404, the
main answer is inertia. The Advisory Committee simply notes that
the three types of evidence admitted under what are now Rules
404(a)(2)(A)-(C) were previously common law exceptions to the
propensity character evidence proscription "[i]n most jurisdictions"
and that "[t]his pattern is incorporated in the rule." 40 According to
the Committee, while the basis for these exceptions "lies more in
history and experience than in logic an underlying justification can
fairly be found in terms of the relative presence and absence of
prejudice in the various situations."41 Moreover, the Committee
found that these exceptions were "so deeply imbedded in our

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 492 S.E.2d 212, 213 (Ga. 1997) (finding no problem with
four character witnesses testifying that the victim was peaceful because the homicide
defendant claimed that the victim was the first aggressor); State v. Faison, 330 N.C. 347,
354-55, 411 S.E.2d 143, 147 (1991) ("Regardless of how this exception is generally used,
the plain meaning of the 'first aggressor' exception is abundantly clear: if a defendant
presents evidence that the victim was the first aggressor in the confrontation which led to
the victim's death, the State can offer evidence of the victim's peacefulness.").
38. 98-KA-00723-COA, 778 So. 2d 779 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
39. Id. (1 22), 777 So. 2d at 785.
40. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
41. Id.
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jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions and to
override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence."42
On the one hand, the Committee's words are almost critiqueproof. The Committee claims that the drafters of Rule 404 are simply
carrying the old common law practice into the new Federal Rules and
that this practice is based more upon history and experience than
logic.43 However, the Committee's other rationales belie the
simplicity of this argument, which falls apart under further inspection.
Initially, in other contexts relating to character evidence, the
drafters of the Federal Rules saw no need to be beholden to old
common law practices. Assume first that in Bedford, Brown, the
victim, had a juvenile adjudication for perjury. Second, assume that
(a) Brown did not die and Bedford was charged with attempted
murder, or (b) Brown did die after making a dying declaration to an
EMT that Bedford shot and killed him. Under the common law, in
most jurisdictions, Bedford would not have been able to use evidence
of the juvenile adjudication (a) to impeach Brown's testimony at the
attempted murder trial, or (b) to impeach his dying declaration at the
murder trial. Instead, at the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, "[t]he prevailing view ha[d] been that a juvenile
adjudication [was] not usable for impeachment.""
The drafters of the Federal Rules, however, decided to adopt a
different approach by creating Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d),
which allows for the admission of evidence of a juvenile adjudication
for impeachment purposes when such impeachment, inter alia, "is
necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence."45 As noted by the
Advisory Committee,46 this change was influenced in large part by the
Supreme Court's 1974 opinion in Davis v. Alaska,4 7 in which the
Court found that a trial court denied the defendant his constitutional
right to confrontation by precluding him from impeaching a key
witness for the prosecution through evidence of his juvenile
adjudication for burglary.48
Davis thus provides a useful analogue to the Advisory
Committee's rationale that the "mercy rule" exists because it is so
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
44. FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note.
45. Id. 609(d).
46. See id. 609 advisory committee's note ("Davis involved the use of a prior juvenile
adjudication not to prove a past law violation, but to prove bias.").
47. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
48. Id. at 318.
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imbedded as to assume almost constitutional proportions.49 It could
be said that a court precluding a defendant from presenting evidence
of the victim's character for violence similarly deprives the defendant
of his right to confrontation."o Furthermore, the preclusion of such
evidence or evidence of the defendant's good character could deprive
the defendant of his right to present a defense or his right to due
process.5 ' An analogy can be drawn to Dickerson v. United States,s2 in
which the Supreme Court refused to overrule Miranda because
"Miranda has become embedded in routine practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national culture.""
All of this makes sense because the purpose of the Miranda
warnings, the Confrontation Clause, the Compulsory Process Clause,
and the Due Process Clause is to protect citizens from arbitrary
exercises of power by the government." In finding a constitutional
violation in its aforementioned opinion in Davis v. Alaska, the
Supreme Court cited Greene v. McElory" for the proposition that

49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. For instance, in State v. Rice, No. 58643, 1991 WL 97412 (Ohio Ct. App. June 6,
1991), a defendant convicted of murder claimed on appeal that the trial court violated his
right to confrontation by precluding him from presenting evidence of the victim's violent
character. Id. at *2.
51. See United States v. Drapeau, 644 F.3d 646, 660 (8th Cir. 2011) (Bright, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that that the exclusion of evidence of
the alleged victim's character for violence violated the defendant's right to present a
defense); State v. Carter, 636 A.2d 821, 829-30 (Conn. 1994) (finding that the trial court's
exclusion of evidence of the alleged victim's violent character violated due process and the
right to present a defense).
52. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
53. Id. at 443.
54. See Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 104 (2009) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("Substantive due process expresses the conception that the liberty it protects
is a freedom from arbitrary government action, from restraints lacking any reasonable
justification. ... " (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 487, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)));
Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The Compulsory Process clause
protects the presentation of the defendant's case from unwarranted interference by the
government, be it in the form of an unnecessary evidentiary rule, a prosecutor's
misconduct, or an arbitrary ruling by the trial judge."); John Robert Knoebber, Comment,
Say That to My Face: Applying an Objective Approach to Determine the Meaning of
Testimony in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 51 LOY. L. REv. 497, 500 (2005) ("Further,
such an approach would serve the goal of the Framers in drafting the Confrontation
Clause-to protect citizens from arbitrary judicial determinations."); Trisha Choksi, The
Scope of Miranda Rights in Prison: When Is Someone in Custody "In Custody"?, DCBA
BRIEF, Nov. 2011, at 22, 27 ("The inherent secrecy surrounding interrogation inside of a
prison lends itself to the kind of improper police conduct and arbitrary use of power that
Miranda was meant to protect.").
55. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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[c]ertain principles have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the
action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that
he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is
important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact,
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice,
vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have
formalized these protections in the requirements of
confrontation and cross-examination . . . . 56
Of course, the serious injury in Davis, as in Bedford, was the
criminal prosecution of the defendant, and Rule 609(d) and Rules
404(a)(2)(A) and (B) are valuable tools for the defendant to test the
veracity of witnesses for the prosecution. But what about Rule
404(a)(2)(C)? .
That Rule is a windfall for the government, allowing it to prove
the victim's character for peacefulness even without the defendant
asserting that the victim was generally a violent person. It thus
subverts the general understanding that the Constitution is designed
to protect the people from the government rather than the other way
around." Even a governmental power such as eminent domain, which
some courts discuss in a way that makes it seem like it protects the
government from the people, requires that the government give "just
compensation" for its taking of a citizen's property."
56. 415 U.S. 308, 317 n.4 (1974) (quoting Greene, 360 U.S. at 496).
57. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(C).
58. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 804 P.2d 376, 379 (Mont. 1991)
("The protections guaranteed by the constitutional right to due process were designed to
protect people from governmental abuses. They were not designed to protect the
government from the people.").
59. See Gideon Kanner, That Was the Year That Was: Recent Developments in
Eminent Domain Law, SE45 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 571, 578 (2000) ("First, eminent domain
proceedings are a judicial implementation of a vital constitutional guarantee (the 'just
compensation' clause of the Fifth Amendment) and in that context it is remarkable, to put
it with restraint, that some courts act and speak as if the function of that constitutional
provision were to protect the government from the people, rather than the other way
around."). As Randy Barnett has noted, "[W]e must never forget that the rule of law is
meant to protect the people from the government, not to protect the government from the
people." Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: UnenumeratedConstitutionalRights and the Rule of
Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 642 (1991); see also Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 47 (1997) ("It distorts
constitutional provisions that protect the people from the government into provisions that
protect the government from the people.").

2013]

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

1173

However, under Rule 404(a)(2)(C), the defendant gets nothing.
Indeed, the Rule places the defendant in a no-win situation. Recall
that under Rule 404(a)(2)(B), if the defendant attacks the character
of the victim, it opens the door for the prosecution to attack the
character of the defendant. 0 This portion of Rule 404(a)(2)(B) was
added in 2000, with the Advisory Committee giving the following
reasoning for the amendment: "If the government has evidence that
the accused has a violent character, but is not allowed to offer this
evidence as part of its rebuttal, the jury has only part of the
information it needs for an informed assessment of the probabilities
as to who was the initial aggressor."" Therefore, "the amendment is
designed to permit a more balanced presentation of character
evidence when an accused chooses to attack the character of the
alleged victim." 62
By looking at this analysis from the defendant's perspective, we
can see the conundrum faced by the accused under Rule
404(a)(2)(C). Assume that a homicide defendant has a colorable
claim that he acted in self-defense and that the victim was the first
aggressor. If that defendant wants to prevent propensity character
evidence from pervading his trial, he needs to refrain from claiming
that the victim was the first aggressor because doing so automatically
opens the door for the prosecution to present evidence of the victim's
peacefulness under Rule 404(a)(2)(C).
Now, assume that the defendant rolls the dice and does claim at
trial that the victim was the first aggressor, prompting the prosecution
to present good character evidence about the victim. If the defendant
has evidence tending to indicate that the victim in fact had a bad
character for violence, he faces another quandary. At this point, in
the words of the Advisory Committee, "the jury has only part of the
information it needs for an informed assessment of the probabilities
as to who was the initial aggressor."' The defendant of course can
correct this information imbalance by presenting his character
evidence concerning the victim, but, by doing so, he opens his own
character to attack under Rule 404(a)(2)(B).65 In other words, when a
homicide defendant has a colorable claim of self-defense that the
victim was the first aggressor, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) immediately puts
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B).
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
Id.
See id. 404(a)(2)(C).
Id. 404 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
See id. 404(a)(2)(B).
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him behind the eight ball and forces him to make Solomonic choices
regarding whether he should even present his defense or whether he
can rebut the saintly image of the victim presented by the
prosecution.
Consider this from the perspective of the innocent defendant. If
the victim really was the first aggressor, and the defendant honestly
and reasonably responded with lethal force, self-defense is not merely
a potentially viable defense; it is almost certainly his only defense.
Rule 404(a)(2)(C) thus forces the innocent defendant either to avoid
raising his only available defense or to raise that defense but lose his
ability to prevent propensity character evidence from pervading his
trial.
As the previous reference to Rule 609(d) makes clear, Rule
404(a)(2)(C) cannot be defended as a mere extension of the common
law when the drafters of the Federal Rules clearly made a course
correction regarding the admissibility of somewhat similar evidencejuvenile adjudications-in order to protect the constitutional rights of
defendants.66 Additionally, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) cannot be defended as
a rule of quasi-constitutional proportions because it protects the
government from the people rather than the people from the
government.67 Thus, if Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is defensible at all, it is
based upon what the Advisory Committee referred to as the "relative
presence and absence of prejudice in the various situations." The
following Part addresses those situations.
II. PROPENSITY CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN QUASI-CRIMINAL
CASES, FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING, DYING DECLARATIONS,
AND THE CRIMINAL/CIVIL DIVIDE

This Part will first discuss the reasons why the "mercy rule" was
limited to criminal cases and how those reasons cut directly against
the existence of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C) and, then,
explain why neither the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, nor the
dying declaration exception to the Rule against hearsay, provides a
coherent rationale for the Rule.
66. See id. 609 advisory committee's note ("The rule recognizes discretion in the judge
to effect an accommodation among these various factors by departing from the general
principle of exclusion.").
67. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The relevant question in this regard
is, "What constitutional principle could allow the prosecution to present evidence
possessing such dubious reliability and such certain prejudice against a criminal defendant
who merely asserts a potentially viable defense?"
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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A.

Propensity CharacterEvidence in Quasi-CriminalTrials, the 2006
Amendment to Rule 404, and How the Rationalefor the "Mercy
Rule" Cuts Directly Against Rule 404(a) (2) (C)
In the wake of the passage of Federal Rule of Evidence 404,
courts split on the issue of whether the "mercy rule" applied solely in
criminal cases or whether it also applied in quasi-criminal cases, i.e.,
civil proceedings involving acts that are also punishable under
criminal law."9
For instance, in Crumpton v. Confederation Life Insurance Co.,"
a daughter, the beneficiary of an accidental death policy that covered
her father, brought a civil action against the insurer for refusing to
pay her the proceeds of the policy after her father died." The
company's defense was that a neighbor shot and killed the father
because he raped her, rendering the policy inapplicable because the
father's death was not accidental.72 In response, the daughter
presented character evidence indicating that her father did not act
violently or aggressively toward women."
In affirming the admission of this evidence, the Fifth Circuit
found that while the "mercy rule" generally only applies "to criminal
cases, the unusual circumstances here place the case very close to one
of a criminal nature."" The court held that "[t]he focus of the civil
suit on the insurance policy was the issue of rape, and the resulting
trial was in most respects similar to a criminal case for rape."75
Accordingly, it concluded that the character evidence was admissible,
because, "[h]ad there been a criminal case against [the father],
evidence of his character that was pertinent would have been
admissible." 6
Other courts, however, concluded that the "mercy rule" applied
only in true criminal cases.n In 2006, Rule 404 was amended to make
clear that the "mercy rule" only applies "in a criminal case."
According to the Advisory Committee, this amendment was
"consistent with the original intent of the Rule, which was to prohibit
69. Miller, supra note 18, at 1001.
70, 672 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 1250-51.
72. See id. at 1251.
73. See id. at 1251-52.
74. Id. at 1253.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Miller, supra note 18, at 1016 ("[T]he majority of courts found that those
Rules were solely applicable to criminal cases and per se inapplicable in civil cases.").
78. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).

1176

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

the circumstantial use of character evidence in civil cases, even where
closely related to criminal charges." 9
Specifically, the Committee noted that "[t]he circumstantial use
of character evidence is generally discouraged because it carries
serious risks of prejudice, confusion and delay.""o That said, "[i]n
criminal cases, the so-called 'mercy rule' permits a criminal defendant
to introduce evidence of pertinent character traits of the defendant
and the victim." 81 But, according to the Committee, "that is because
the accused, whose liberty is at stake, may need 'a counterweight
against the strong investigative and prosecutorial resources of the
government.' "82 As support for this claim, the Committee cited to an
article contending that "the rule prohibiting circumstantial use of
character evidence 'was relaxed to allow the criminal defendant with
so much at stake and so little available in the way of conventional
proof to have special dispensation to tell the factfinder just what sort
of person he really is.' "" Conversely, the Committee found that
"[t]hose concerns do not apply to parties in civil cases."8
Apparently then, the "situations" referenced in the Advisory
Committee's Note accompanying the original Rule 404 were civil and
criminal trials. Propensity character evidence is too prejudicial,
confusing, and time consuming to be admitted at a civil trial in which
the stakes are generally lower and both parties can possess
commensurate resources.85 However, in a criminal trial, where both
the stakes and the power imbalance can be significantly higher, the
defendant should be able to present propensity character evidence as
a counterweight so that the scales of justice are not tipped so strongly
in the government's direction."
This explanation gives a coherent rationale for Rules
404(a)(2)(A) and (B). Conversely, this rationale seemingly drives a
stake through the heart of Rule 404(a)(2)(C). Rather than allowing a
defendant, however slightly, to level the playing field in a criminal
trial, the Rule gives prosecutors one more weapon in their vast

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. 404 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER
THE RULES 264-65 (2d ed. 1999)).
83. Id. (quoting Richard Uviller, Evidence of Characterto Prove Conduct: Illusion,
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 855 (1982)).
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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arsenal. Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is thus directly antithetical to the stated
purposes of the "mercy rule."
Most disturbingly, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) gives a strategic advantage
to the State in the very type of case "to which the greatest police
resources are assigned and which often leads to intensive and longterm investigations."' This, of course, makes sense: "Because
homicide is the worst of all crimes, it is easy to understand why a
single homicide investigation is given much greater resources than the
investigation of a single robbery, a single burglary, and so on."a
Moreover, as the "worst of all crimes," murder is the only crime,
besides crimes against the state such as treason, that is eligible for the
death penalty, and "a capital trial consumes significantly more
resources than a noncapital trial."" Capital defendants are also more
likely than regular defendants to be indigent and require the services
of a public defender,90 which increases the power and resource
disparity given the current public defender crisis.
This strategic advantage can be exacerbated by the fact that
capital defendants have no right to bail; "federal law has
unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital
offense shall be admitted to bail"92 while there is no "federal
constitutional right to bail in capital cases in this country." 93
Additionally, "twenty-seven states retain statutes, constitutional
provisions, or criminal rules that define capital offenses generally as
being non-bailable." 94 This means that the resource gap in capital

87. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons,1980-1996,
26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 32 (1999).
88. David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43,
162 (2007).
89. State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 1 12, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264.
90. Compare Adam Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representation
of Criminal Defendants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REV. 97, 139
(2010) ("[Tlhe truth remains that 'approximately ninety percent of capital defendants are
indigent' and thus receive the services of each state's public defender system." (quoting
Jeffrey Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 149 (2001))), with Eve Brensike Primus,
A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 50 (2010) (noting that "80
percent of criminal defendants are represented by public defenders").
91. For instance, "in November 2008, public defenders' offices from seven states
either refused to take on new cases or sued to limit them, citing overwhelming workloads
that prevented defendants from receiving adequate attention, time, and representation."
Laura I. Appleman, The PleaJury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 769 (2010).
92. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
93. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515, 527 n.71 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
94. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723,
750 n.160 (2011).
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cases can be especially large because a defendant who cannot procure
pretrial release is limited in his ability to "consult with counsel, gather
evidence and confer with witnesses." 95
These last points, of course, underscore the fact that a homicide
defendant has much more at stake than the typical criminal
defendant. A federal homicide defendant faces the very real specter
of death at the end of his trial, as do many homicide defendants in
state court." Additionally, even when a homicide defendant does not
face the specter of the literal loss of his life as the result of a death
sentence, he faces the chance of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, as was the case in Bedford.97
In sum, a defendant charged with murder (and especially a
capital defendant charged with murder) faces much higher stakes and
a significantly larger deployment of state investigatory and
prosecutorial resources than the typical defendant. The Advisory
Committee has claimed that two factors support the "mercy rule": (1)
the fact that a criminal defendant typically has more a~t stake than a
civil defendant and (2) the fact that the resource gap between
criminal defendant and prosecution is typically larger than the
resource gap between civil defendant and civil plaintiff." Because
these two factors directly cut against the viability of Rule
404(a)(2)(C), the Rule and state counterparts should be repealed
unless a defense for it can be hypothesized.
B.

No Coherent Rationale Explains Rule 404(a)(2)(C)

1. Forfeiture Does Not Provide a Coherent Rationale for Rule
404(a)(2)(C)
A first possible alternate rationale for Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is
forfeiture: that, by causing the death of the victim, the defendant
forfeits his right to object to the admission of evidence of the victim's
character for peacefulness. Before 2008, those defending Rule
404(a)(2)(C) could have found an analogue in the way that some
95. In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
96. See, e.g., Richard C. Alexander, "Cost Savings" as Proceeds of Crime: A
Comparative Study of the United States and the United Kingdom, 45 INT'L LAW. 749, 754
(2011) ("[T]he death penalty exists not only in U.S. federal law but also in the state laws of
the majority of the U.S. states . . . .").
97. See James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice,Majority's Burden: The
Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 321 (2011) ("[Tlhe only choice
prosecutors and jurors have in real capital murder cases, in every state in the nation, is
between death and life without parole.").
98. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
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courts interpreted the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.99 As
previously noted, criminal defendants have the right to confront
witnesses against them." This right, conferred by the Confrontation
Clause, inter alia, generally precludes the admission of "testimonial"
hearsay against an accused unless (1) the hearsay declarant is
"unavailable" and (2) the defendant previously had the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.' 0'
In some cases, however, a criminal defendant forfeits his right to
object to the admission of such "testimonial" hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause and the Rules of Evidence pursuant to the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. This doctrine provides that a
party who causes the unavailability of a prospective witness at trial
forfeits his objection to the admissibility of hearsay statements made
by that prospective witness.102 Before 2008, courts primarily applied
this forfeiture doctrine in two types of cases.
One type of case was the witness tampering case. For instance, in
United States v. Battle,10' the United States District Court for the
District of Florida deemed hearsay statements by a prospective
witness admissible under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing
after determining that the defendants caused the witness to flee by
threatening his life.' 04
The second type of case involved a defendant killing a victim
who was not at the time a prospective witness against the defendant.
In such a case, if the victim had made prior statements of fear
regarding the defendant, some courts would allow for the admission
of those statements under the doctrine. For example, in State v.
Jensen,0 a wife gave a letter to a neighbor with the instruction that
she turn it over to the police if anything happened to her.' When the
wife later turned up dead and her husband was charged with the
99. See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, $ 57, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518 ("In
short, we adopt a broad forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, and conclude that if the State
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused caused the absence of the
witness, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine will apply to the confrontation rights of the
defendant.").
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . .
101. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,68 (2004).
102. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (providing a hearsay exception for "[a] statement
offered against a party that wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully causing-the
declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result").
103. 473 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
104. See id. at 1195.
105. 2007 WI 26,299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.
106. Id. 5.
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murder, the trial court found that letter admissible under the
doctrine, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed."'o
In 2008, however, the Supreme Court deemed the doctrine on
forfeiture by wrongdoing inapplicable in this second type of case. In
People v. Giles,10 Dwayne Giles shot and killed his long-time
girlfriend, Brenda Avie.109 At trial, Giles argued that the shooting was
in self-defense after Avie "charged" him." 0 In response, the
prosecution called a police officer, who testified about statements
Avie made to him after he responded to a report of domestic violence
involving Giles and Avie a few weeks before the fatal shooting.'
After Giles was convicted of murder, he appealed, claiming that
the admission of Avie's testimonial hearsay statements to the officer
violated his right of confrontation." 2 The Court of Appeal of
California disagreed, finding that the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing applies as long as a defendant causes the unavailability of
a hearsay declarant through an intentional criminal act; the defendant
"need not additionally possess the purpose of rendering the witness
unavailable for trial.""' In other words, the court found that
forfeiture applies even when the criminal act causing the declarant's
unavailability is the same criminal act for which the defendant is
being prosecuted.
The Supreme Court of California later affirmed this opinion, in
compliance with the interpretation of forfeiture by wrongdoing in a
number of jurisdictions.' 14 Meanwhile, several other jurisdictions did
require a criminal defendant to cause the declarant's unavailability
while possessing the intent to render the declarant unavailable to
testify at trial for forfeiture to apply."' For these courts, the forfeiture
by wrongdoing doctrine operated as a witness-tampering rule, with
forfeiture only applying when the defendant's act of killing (or
107. See id. 158.
108. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007), vacated
sub nom. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
109. Id. at 845.
110. Id. at 846.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 845.
113. Id. at 850.
114. See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 441-42 (Cal. 2007) (noting that "[s]ome federal
and state courts" did not require that defendant possess the purpose of rendering the
witness unavailable for trial for forfeiture by wrongdoing to apply), vacated sub nom. Giles
v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
115. See id. at 442 ("Other courts have stated that the intent-to-silence requirement is
an element of their forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrines, although stopping short of holding
that the intent requirement is constitutionally compelled.").
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incapacitation) came after the instigation of legal proceedings, not
when the act of killing is what led to the instigation of legal
proceedings.'16
Because of this split in authority, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Giles v. California."'The Court ultimately
disagreed with California's interpretation of forfeiture by wrongdoing
and found that the doctrine only applies when the defendant caused a
witness to be unavailable at trial and "intended to prevent a witness
from testifying.""' Accordingly, forfeiture by wrongdoing is, in
essence, a witness-tampering rule and would not apply to a defendant
who kills the victim, is charged with her murder, and claims selfdefense. To wit, on remand, the Court of Appeal of California
reversed Giles's conviction, finding that "the prosecutor presented no
evidence that [Giles] killed Avie with intent to prevent her from
testifying or cooperating in a criminal prosecution.""'
The factual context in Giles was the same as the factual context
in Bedford and other first aggressor cases. Therefore, if Giles did not
forfeit his right to object to the admission of Avie's statements by
killing her, there is no reason to think that Bedford forfeited his right
to object to the admission of evidence of Brown's character for
peacefulness by killing him. The same, of course, should apply in any
murder trial. Just as a defendant does not forfeit his right to object to
the admission of a victim's hearsay statements by killing him, a
defendant should not forfeit his right to object to the admission of
character evidence regarding a victim simply because he killed the
victim.
2. Waiver Does Not Provide a Coherent Rationale for Rule
404(a)(2)(C)
Of course, a defendant triggers Rule 404(a)(2)(C) not merely by
killing the victim but also by claiming self-defense and that the victim
was the first aggressor. The question thus becomes whether a
defendant arguably waives his ability to object to the admission of
evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness by claiming that
the victim was the first aggressor.
116. See id.
117. 552 U.S. 1136 (2008).
118. Giles, 554 U.S. at 361.
119. People v. Giles, No. 1166937, 2009 WL 457832, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25,
2009). Giles was afforded a new trial and again found guilty, and this conviction was
affirmed on appeal. See People v. Giles, No. B224629, 2012 WL 130659 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
18, 2012).
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Such waiver would not be unusual under the Rules of Evidence,
which allow certain evidentiary protections to be waived when parties
make claims or defenses that place certain facts "in issue." For
instance, under the attorney-client privilege, a client has the ability to
prevent his attorney from testifying regarding confidential
communications between the two relating to representation. 2 0 When,
however, the client sues his attorney for malpractice or claims that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel, "he puts
communications between himself and his attorney directly in issue,
and thus by implication waives the attorney-client privilege with
respect to those communications."12 1
In the character evidence context, the relevant rule is Federal
Rule of Evidence 405(b), which states: "When a person's character or
character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,
the character or trait may also be proved by relevant specific
instances of the person's conduct." 22
Rule 405(b) applies in a small universe of cases. The most typical
Rule 405(b) cases involve issues such as defamation, entrapment, and
negligent hiring, entrustment, or supervision.12 3 In a defamation case,
a politician might sue a newspaper for libel, claiming that it published
a false article stating that he was an adulterer. In response, the
newspaper could claim the absolute defense of truth. In this case, the
politician's character for adultery would be "in issue" and an essential
element of the newspaper's truth defense because the newspaper
could not prove its defense without proving that the politician was an
adulterer. There would be no other way to prove the truth of the
story. Accordingly, under Rule 405(b), the newspaper could present
evidence of specific instances of adultery by the politician in addition
to opinion and reputation testimony. 12 4
Similarly, assume that an injured bus passenger sued a city for
negligent hiring after a city bus driver got into an accident while
driving drunk. If the passenger's claim was that the city was negligent
120. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2005)
("Familiarly, the attorney-client privilege-somewhat simplified-is a privilege of a client
to refuse to testify or to have his counsel testify as to confidential communications
between the two made in connection with the rendering of legal representation.
121. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972,977-78 (10th Cir. 2009).
122. FED. R. EvID. 405(b).
123. See Miller, supra note 18, at 1024.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Manfredi, Crim. No. 07-352, 2009 WL 3762966, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2009) (noting that Rule 405(b) applies in "a defamation case where the
plaintiff's claim is that the defendant's defamatory statements harmed his reputation for
good character").

2013]

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

1183

in hiring the driver because of his history of DUIs, the driver's
character for drunk driving would be "in issue" and an essential
element of the passenger's claim. The passenger could not prove the
city's negligence without proving the reason for that negligence:
hiring a driver with a history of DUIs. For the same reason, if
customers sued a store for negligent supervision after a security guard
allegedly falsely imprisoned them, evidence of prior acts of jobrelated misconduct by the guard would be admissible to prove why
the store was negligent in not previously firing or disciplining the
guard. 125
Finally, if a defendant charged with a crime claims entrapment as
a defense, the defendant (in many jurisdictions) has to prove, inter
alia, that he was not predisposed to commit the crime charged. 126 This
means that the prosecution has to rebut the defendant's evidence with
evidence of predisposition, meaning that the defendant's character is
"in issue" and an essential element of an entrapment defense.
Accordingly, under Rule 405(b), the prosecution can prove the
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime charged by presenting
evidence of the defendant's prior, similar crimes.127
So, is evidence of the victim's character "in issue" and an
essential element of a homicide defendant's claim of self-defense
when the defendant claims that the victim was the first aggressor?
That was certainly the understanding of the trial court in Bedford as
revealed by the following exchange that preceded the introduction of
Sergeant Butts' character evidence:
[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Sergeant [Sean] Butts [whom] I
indicated to counsel before for purposes of discovery that he
knew [Victim] personally for 13 years, and he would just testify
that he had never known [Victim] to be a violent person, never
to carry a weapon, never to be physical, and that's it.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would object to it. I don't think it's
relevant. If you want me to expand on his prior history in terms
of whether he was a nice guy or a peaceful person, I don't think
125. See Panas v. Harakis, 529 A.2d 976, 989 (N.H. 1987) (finding that under Rule
405(b), customers claiming false imprisonment by a K-Mart guard could present evidence
that the guard had previously represented himself as a police officer to a customer to
prove negligent supervision).
126. See United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790,800 (7th Cir. 2007).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 546 (5th Cir. 1986) ("When
entrapment is raised as a defense, the criminal defendant makes his own character an
essential trial issue. The government may therefore introduce proof of his prior wrongs.
Fed. R. Evid. 405(b).").
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it's of [any] moment at this point. We're dealing with what
happened on that particular day.
[THE COMMONWEALTH]: [Appellant] has put it at issue by
making a claim that he was violent and overly aggressive or
physical. It's simply to rebut that.
[THE COURT]: Response[?]
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, I believe it's of no moment as
to his prior history. There's no evidence in this record to
indicate that [Victim] had any violent propensities in the past.
All we're talking about is that particular day at that particular
time. That's what [Appellant] testified to, that he was assaulted
at that time. Whether this man may have never assaulted
anybody in his life before or was a peaceful person, never
carried a gun, I don't believe is relevant to the issues ... which

is what happened on that moment, on that date.
[THE COURT]: We'll allow it and just address it with the
appropriate point for charge if you feel it necessary. The [c]ourt
has determined [Victim's] character was brought into issue
during the course of the trial, specifically in [Appellant's]

case.128
Yet, is the victim's character really "in issue" for evidentiary
purposes when the defendant in a homicide case claims that the
victim was the first aggressor? The answer among courts is a
near-categorical "no." For instance, in State v. Prtine,'2 ' Andy Prtine
stabbed Brent Ward at least sixty-three times, causing his death.'30
Prtine claimed self-defense at trial and that Ward was the first
aggressor after a drug deal, with Ward hitting him in the face and
grabbing the murder weapon before Prtine wrested it away from him
and stabbed him to death.'
In response, the prosecutor asked a character witness whether
Ward was a violent person, and the witness responded, "No."" 2 The
prosecutor then asked the witness what she meant by this response,
and the witness responded (1) "that she once saw Ward get punched
in the face while at a bar and refuse to fight back" and (2) "that on
another occasion, Ward was slapped in the face and Ward's only
128.
2012).
129.
130.
131.
132.

50 A.3d 707, 714 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (emphasis added), appeal denied, 57 A.3d 65 (Pa.
784 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2010).
Id. at 308.
See id. at 309.
Id. at 314.
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reaction was to turn to his friends and say, '[Ilet's get out of here.' "I"
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, both sides agreed that
these responses were improper because the victim's character is not
an essential element of a defendant's claim that the victim was the
first aggressor. 3 4 Specifically, the defendant cited to the Supreme
Court of Minnesota's prior opinion in State v. Bland,"' in which it
cited Louisell and Mueller for the proposition that
[it cannot be said] that specific instances of past violence by the
victim may be proved where these are relevant solely as tending
to show his probable actions at the time of the alleged crime.
Rule 405(b) allows evidence of specific instances only where
these amount to an "element of a charge, claim, or defense": It
is clear that specific instances of the victim's past conduct do
not amount to such an element in cases of homicide or criminal
assault-they amount at most to circumstantial evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor, and it is this latter fact which
amounts to an element of the defense of self defense.' 36
Many other courts have employed similar reasoning in
concluding that a victim's character is not an essential element of a
defendant's claim that the victim was the first aggressor."' This of
course makes sense "because it is just as unlawful to murder a violent
person as it is to murder a nonviolent person."13 8
The case that best explains this reasoning is Allen v. State."' In
Allen, Albert Allen stabbed Devron Labat to death and claimed at
133. Id. (alteration in original).
134. Compare Appellant's Brief at 36, Prtine,784 N.W.2d 303 (No. A09-0702) ("[T]his
Court has long recognized that specific instances of the victim's past conduct do not
amount to . . . an element of the defense of self defense for purposes of Rule 405(b)."
(internal quotation marks omitted)), with Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 32 n.10,
Paine,784 N.W.2d 303 (No. A09-0702) ("Respondent acknowledges that specific-instance
testimony was likely objectionable as to this witness under Minn. R. Evid. 405. . . "). The
only issue on appeal was whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting these
responses. See Prtine,784 N.W.2d at 315.
135. 337 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1983).
136. Id. at 383 (quoting 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 150
(1978)).
137. See, e.g., State v. Sheahan, No. 25224, 2002 WL 31186625, at *8 (Idaho Ct. App.
2002) ("Rule 404(a)(2) does not permit the admission of specific acts to show a victim's
nature."); State v. Olander, 575 N.W.2d 658, 666-67 (N.D. 1998) (finding that the
prosecution would not be able to present specific acts of the victim's good character on
remand in a homicide case in which the defendant claimed that the victim was the first
aggressor); State v. Fondren, 701 P.2d 810, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) ("Furthermore,
evidence of a peaceful character is presented through testimony of reputation, not specific
instances of conduct.").
138. Milton v. State, 262 S.E.2d 789, 791 (Ga. 1980).
139. 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
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trial that Labat was the first aggressor.4 0 Allen bolstered his claim
through evidence of prior, specific acts of violence by Labat, and the
prosecution responded with evidence of prior, specific acts of violence
by Allen."' In finding on appeal that the evidence offered by both
sides was improperly admitted, the Court of Appeals of Alaska relied
upon substantial federal and state authority to conclude that
neither Labat's character for violence nor Allen's character for
violence was "an essential element" of the State's murder
charge or of Allen's self-defense defense. The jury could adopt
Allen's self-defense theory even if they concluded that Labat
was not a characteristically violent man; that is, a
characteristically peaceful person may yet be an aggressor.
Similarly, the jury could acquit Allen under a self-defense
theory even if they concluded that Allen was characteristically
given to violence; the defense of self-defense is available to all,
even to characteristically violent people. By the same token, the
jury could reject Allen's claim of self-defense and convict Allen
of murder even if they disbelieved the State's evidence of
Allen's violent character and instead concluded that Allen was,
by nature, a peaceful man.
In sum, when a defendant raises a claim of self-defense and the
court admits evidence of either the victim's or the defendant's
character for violence or non-violence, this evidence is not
admitted to prove an essential element of the crime or of the
defense. The character evidence is relevant, not because
character is an essential element of self-defense, but because
the participants' character is circumstantial proof of the
participants' likely conduct during the episode in question.14 2
Because the victim's character is not an essential element of a
criminal defendant's claim that the victim was the first aggressor,
evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is governed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a), not Federal Rule of Evidence
405(b). 43 Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a) states that
[w]hen evidence of a person's character or character trait is
admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person's
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross140. See id. at 1234.
141. See id. at 1240.
142. Id.

143. See State v. Fondren, 701 P.2d 810, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) ("Furthermore,
evidence of a peaceful character is presented through testimony of reputation, not specific
instances of conduct." (citing WASH. R. EVID. 405(a))).
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examination of the character witness, the court may allow an
inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person's
conduct.1 "
Rule 405(a) thus explains the result in Prtine and similar cases.
Because the victim's character in Prtine was not an essential element
of the defendant's claim that the victim was the first aggressor, the
character witness could give opinion and/or reputation testimony
concerning the victim's character for peacefulness under Rule
405(a).145 But, on direct examination, that witness could not testify
regarding specific acts of peacefulness by the victim because Rule
405(b) was inapplicable, which is why her testimony about the victim
twice turning the other cheek was improperly admitted.146 Therefore,
because a defendant does not place the victim's character for
peacefulness "in issue" for evidentiary purposes by claiming that the
victim was the first aggressor, waiver does not provide a coherent
rationale for Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C).
3. Evidentiary Need Does Not Provide a Coherent Rationale for
Rule 404(a)(2)(C)
There is one final hypothetical rationale that could support the
existence of Rule 404(a)(2)(C): the exceptional need for evidence of
the victim's character for peacefulness in a homicide case. Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement. 47
In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 deems hearsay "generally
inadmissible precisely because it is considered unreliable." 48
When the declarant is unavailable, however, Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(2) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay
"[iln a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, [for] a statement
that the declarant, while believing the declarant's death to be
imminent, made about its cause or circumstances."149 As noted by the
Supreme Court of Alaska, "Two basic reasons have been advanced
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
See State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303,314 (Minn. 2010).
See id.
FED.R.EvID. 801(c).
United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 780 (10th Cir. 2010).
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
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for admission of such testimony: necessity, because of the witness's
death, and a belief that the approach of death removes ordinary
motives to misstate."' According to the Advisory Committee, Rule
804(b)(2) is an extension of the common law exception for dying
declarations, which "no doubt originated as a result of the exceptional
need for the evidence in homicide cases."' 51
So, can an analogy be drawn between Rule 804(b)(2) and Rule
404(a)(2)(C) because they both allow for the admission of evidence
concerning a victim who cannot take the witness stand and defend his
actions in the events giving rise to the commencement of legal
proceedings? For five reasons, the clear answer is "no": (a) dying
declarations are admitted based on evidentiary need and reliability;
(b) dying declarations merely place both parties in the same position
they would have occupied had the victim survived; (c) dying
declarations do not solely benefit the prosecution; (d) the dying
declaration exception applies in all homicide trials; and (e) the dying
declaration exception applies in civil and criminal cases.
Dying DeclarationsAre Admitted Based on Evidentiary
Need and Reliability
First, as noted, dying declarations are admitted not only because
of the exceptional need for their admission but also because they are
thought to be reliable as the dying declarant lacks the "ordinary
motives to misstate."' 52 Many, including the Advisory Committee,5 '
believe that the exception is religious in origin, with the reliability of a
dying declaration being based upon the belief that " '[no person, who
is immediately going into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a
lie upon his lips.' "154 Accordingly, some believe that the exception is
outdated, especially in light of scientific evidence concerning the
deficits of "perception, memory, comprehension, and clarity of
communication" suffered by those that have experienced trauma that
brought them to the brink of death.'
The key question, though, is not whether dying declarations are
actually reliable but whether the drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence
a.

150. Johnson v. State, 579 P.2d 20, 24 (Alaska 1978).
151. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note.
152. Johnson,579 P.2d at 24.
153. See FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note.
154. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (quoting Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim.
Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881) (Lush, L.J.)).
155. Peter Nicolas, 'I'm Dying to Tell You What Happened': The Admissibility of
Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 549
(2010).
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804(b)(2) were justified in asserting that they are reliable. According
to the Advisory Committee, "While the original religious justification
for the exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over
the years, it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological
pressures are present."'"' Under this reasoning,
[alt the moment wherein the deceased realizes his own death is
imminent there can no longer be any temporal self-serving
purpose to be furthered regardless of the speaker's personal
religious beliefs. Indeed, given the physiological revulsion
peculiar to the moment and common to all men, an express
showing of the declarant's theological beliefs is immaterial.'5
As with many rules of evidence, reasonable minds could attack
the soundness of this exception, but as long as reasonable minds could
also believe that dying declarations are reliable, reliability is part of
the justification for Rule 804(b)(2).11s Moreover, the requirement that
a dying declaration be made about the "cause or circumstances" of
what the declarant believes to be his impending death means that a
dying declaration is direct evidence of the events giving rise to the
trial against the defendant.' Furthermore, when, as is often the case,
the declarant identifies the accused as the one who injured him, that
declaration is "sufficient, in itself, to justify submitting the case to the
factfinder." 6 o
Conversely, it is generally understood that character evidence is
especially unreliable for a variety of reasons, including the usual
sources of character evidence. "Numerous courts have expressed the
same opinion as that espoused by the Vermont Supreme Court"16 1 in
Wright v. McKee,162 in which it held that character evidence "is
uncertain in its nature-both because the true character of a large
portion of mankind is ascertained with difficulty, and because those
who are called to testify are reluctant to disparage their neighbors,especially if they are wealthy, influential, popular, or even only

156. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note.
157. People v. Calahan, 356 N.E.2d 942,945 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
158. See, e.g., Smith v. Bunnell, No. 92-55471, 1992 WL 276937, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 9,
1992) ("Where reasonable minds differ about the weight to be attached to a particular
kind of evidence, we can't say that instructing the jury one way or the other renders the
trial fundamentally unfair.").
159. See Nelson v. State, 623 So. 2d 432,435 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
160. Id.
161. Katherine J. Alperin, Comment, CharacterEvidence in the Quasi-CriminalTrial:
An Argument for Admissibility, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2073, 2082 (1999).
162. 37 Vt. 161 (1864).
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pleasant and obliging.""'s Of course, when character evidence does
not come from neighbors, it often comes from family members, who
are especially unreliable given their biases in favor of (and sometimes
against) their children, parents, and siblings.'"
Moreover, while a dying declaration is direct evidence of the
events giving rise to the action against the defendant (and usually
direct evidence that the defendant killed the victim), as noted,
evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness amounts at most to
circumstantial evidence that the victim was not the first aggressor.16 1
This is because the jury has to infer how the victim acted at the time
of his death based upon his character on other occasions, which
causes unwanted side effects. As the Advisory Committee noted,
"The circumstantial use of character evidence is generally
discouraged because it carries serious risks of prejudice, confusion
and delay.""'
In conclusion, it is not merely the evidentiary need for dying
declarations that allows for their admission;" 7 instead, it is that need
coupled with the arguable reliability of such declarations and their
direct bearing on the events giving rise to the action against the
defendant. While the prosecution possibly has the same need for
evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness in a homicide case
in which the defendant claims that the victim was the first aggressor,
the unreliability and circumstantial nature of such evidence
significantly weakens the case for its admission.
Dying DeclarationsMerely Place Both Partiesin the Same
Position They Would Have Occupied Had the Victim
Survived
Second, dying declarations are admitted as a substitute for the
testimony that the victim would have offered at trial had he not died.
If a victim thinks that he is dying and tells medical personnel,
b.

163. Id. at 163.
164. See, e.g., Hudson v. Quarterman, 273 F. App'x 331, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The court
also found that the evidence of positive character traits from Hudson's family would have
appeared biased and of minimal benefit."); State v. Kimbrell, No. M2000-02925-CCA-R3CD, 2003 WL 1877094, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) ("White testified that he decided
not to use other family members as character witnesses due to similar concerns of
perceived bias. . . .").
165. See State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1983) (citing 2 LOUISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 136, § 150).
166. See FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
167. See JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 276, at 243-45 (4th
ed. 1992) ("[N]eed alone has never been thought sufficient to support a hearsay
exception.").
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"[Defendant] shot me," the statement would be admissible as a dying
declaration at the defendant's murder trial because the victim could
have made the same statement on the witness stand if he survived and
the defendant were charged with attempted murder.'6 " In other
words, the evidentiary need for a dying declaration exists because the
victim died and could not testify at trial, and Rule 804(b)(2) puts both
parties in the same position they would have occupied had the victim
survived.
What this means is that a purported dying declaration is
inadmissiblewhen the victim could not have repeated the declaration
on the witness stand had he survived. For example, in State v.
Motley,'6 9 Vernon Motley was charged with murder after allegedly
shooting and killing his ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend.170 Motley's exgirlfriend was Shaka Jones, and, as the victim was dying, a witness
asked him what happened, prompting him to respond, "V shot me.""
When the witness then asked the victim why Motley shot him, the
victim responded, "Over Shaka."n 2 At trial, the witness repeated
both of the victim's statements. 7
After he was convicted, Motley appealed, claiming, inter alia,
that the second statement was improperly admitted because "the
victim's dying declaration should not have been allowed to include
speculation as to the defendant's motive."' 7 4 The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Tennessee found that the issue was governed by State v.
Lewis,17 1 in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that
" 'b]ecause a dying declaration is essentially a substitute for the
testimony of the victim, the admissible evidence is limited to that to
which the victim could have testified if present.' ""6 Under this test,
the court in Motley found that the victim's second statement was
improperly admitted because it could not "conclude that the victim's
opinion of the defendant's motive for the shooting was admissible
under the Lewis standard, i.e., that the victim would have been able
to testify to such if present at the trial." 77

168.
169.
170.
171,

Commonwealth v. Priest, 18 A.3d 1235, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
No. W2010-01989-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1080479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.

172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at *8.

175. 235 S.W.3d 136 (Tenn. 2007).
176. Motley, 2012 WL 1080479, at *8 (quoting Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 150).
177. Id. at *9.
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As previously noted, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(B)
provides that evidence concerning the character of a victim for a
pertinent trait is inadmissible in a criminal trial unless the defendant
opens Pandora's Box and presents evidence concerning the victim's
bad character for that trait.1 78 So, assume that a defendant shoots the
victim, the victim survives, the defendant is charged with attempted
murder, and the defendant claims that the victim was the first
aggressor but does not present any evidence concerning the victim's
character for violence. At the trial for attempted murder, the victim
could not testify that he is a peaceful person because such testimony
would be inadmissible propensity character evidence under Rule
404(a)(1).111 But if the victim dies from the gunshot wound and the
defendant is charged with murder and claims that the victim was the
first aggressor, the prosecution can present evidence of the victim's
character for peacefulness under Rule 404(a)(2)(C). Therefore, the
Rule is not a rule of substitution like Rule 804(b)(2) because it allows
for the admission of evidence that the victim could not have given on
the witness stand had he survived. Unlike Rule 804(b)(2), Rule
404(a)(2)(C) thus does not put both parties in the same position they
would have occupied had the victim survived but instead inexplicably
puts the prosecution in a more advantageous position.
c. Dying DeclarationsDo Not Solely Benefit the Prosecution
Third, like the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, 18 o Rule
804(b)(2) is not a rule that solely benefits the prosecution (or civil
plaintiffs). Instead, "[d]ying declarations are as admissible to
exonerate an accused as they are to convict, and rightly so.""' For
instance, in Mattox v. United States,18 2 the Supreme Court found that a
statement by a dying victim to the defendant's mother, " 'I know
178. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2)(B).
179. Rule 404(a)(1) covers not only testimony by character witnesses but also
testimony by parties or victims themselves concerning their own character. See, e.g.,
United States v. John, 309 F.3d 298, 303 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002) ("We have located no authority
stating that a defendant's own testimony cannot be considered character evidence within
the meaning of rule 404(a)(1)."); Hinnant v. Holland, 92 N.C. App. 142, 151, 374 S.E.2d
152, 157 (1988) (finding that a civil defendant's testimony about his own character was
inadmissible character evidence); State v. Oden, No. 48066-9-1, 2002 WL 31082064, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) ("And if we were to accept Oden's argument that the evidence
constituted character evidence, then his own testimony must be similarly characterized-in
which case the State is entitled to rebut under ER 404(a).").
180. See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment (noting that
forfeiture by wrongdoing "applies to all parties, including the government").
181. State v. Woodard, 499 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
182. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
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Clyde Mattox, your son, and he was not one of the parties who shot
me,' " was admissible as a dying declaration at Mattox's homicide
trial.18

On the other hand, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C) solely
benefits the prosecution, allowing it to present evidence of the
victim's character for peacefulness when a homicide defendant
merely claims that the victim was the first aggressor. The only other
Federal Rules of Evidence that solely allow the prosecution or the
civil plaintiff to admit evidence are Rules of Evidence 413 through
415, which allow for prosecutors and civil plaintiffs to admit (a)
evidence of prior acts of sexual assault by sexual assault defendants
and (b) prior acts of child molestation by child molestation
defendants." Congress enacted Rules 413 through 415 as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 by
circumventing the normal rulemaking process,18 with "[t]he
overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law professors, and legal
organizations" who submitted comments on the Rules opposing
them. 18 6 Essentially, these Rules were a blatant attempt by Congress
to increase conviction rates in sexual assault and child molestation
cases without any nuanced consideration of the probative value and
prejudicial effect.8
To this point, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) has not engendered the same
level of criticism or even any criticism at all. Perhaps this is because
many view Rule 404(a)(2)(C) in the context of the rest of Rule
404(a), which does allow the criminal defendant to present good
character evidence about himself and bad character evidence about
the victim,188 making the Rule appear more evenhanded. But, as with
Rules 413 through 415, which the Standing Committee thought
should be added to Rule 404(a) rather than becoming separate rules,
there is little reason to view Rule 404(a)(2)(C) in the context of the
rest of Rule 404(a). Rule 404(a) provides for the general
inadmissibility of propensity character evidence in all trials, with
183. Id. at 142.
184. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15.
185. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, CharacterEvidence, and the New
CriminalLaw, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 731.
186. Advisory Committee Notes-FRE 412, 413, 414, 415, FED. EVIDENCE REV.,
http://federalevidence.com/node/1121#leg-hisLrules
(last visited Apr. 13, 2013)
(discussing Judicial Conference report submitted to Congress on February 19, 1995).
187. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Bullshit! Why the Retroactive Application of Federal Rules
of Evidence 413-414 and State Counterparts Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 4 NEB. L.
REV. BULL. 3 (2012), http://lawreviewbulletin.unl.edu/?p=1060.
188. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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Rules 404(a)(2)(A) and (B) allowing for the potential admission of
such evidence by both the defense and the prosecution in any
criminal trial.' 9 Conversely, Rule 404(a)(2)(C), like Rules 413
through 415, sets forth a singular power for one side to admit
evidence in a particular type of criminal case, with the admission of
such evidence triggering no new power for the other side.'" Rule
404(a)(2)(C) is thus nothing like Rule 804(b)(2) in this regard.
The Dying DeclarationException Applies in All Homicide
Trials
Fourth, the dying declaration exception applies in all homicide
trials, which is consistent with the evidentiary need rationale. 191 Rule
804(b)(2) is most typically used in cases in which the defendant denies
killing the victim, with the prosecution having a strong evidentiary
need to use the dying declaration to prove the identity of the
murderer.192 But, if the defendant claims self-defense, the prosecution
might have a similar evidentiary need to use a dying declaration to
contradict the defendant's version of events. For instance, in Hamric
v. Bailey,'" the Fourth Circuit found no problem with the district
court's admission of a neighbor's dying declaration that he was on his
side of the fence and ten feet away from the defendant's property to
rebut her claim that she shot him because he was raising the window
to her house. 194
Rule 404(a)(2)(C), however, only applies in cases in which the
defendant "coupl[es] self-defense with evidence of first aggression by
the victim in a homicide case."' This means that the Rule is
inapplicable in cases in which the defendant claims self-defense but
does not claim that the victim was the first aggressor. This limitation
is illogical if the rationale for the Rule is evidentiary need.
There are three primary types of cases in which a homicide
defendant claims self-defense but does not allege that the victim was
the first aggressor:
d.

189. See id. 404(a).
190. See id. 404(a)(2)(C).
191. See id. 804(b)(2).
192. See, e.g., People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598, 611 (App. Div. 2011) (finding no
problem with the admission of the dying declaration "Tom shot me" to prove the
defendant's identity as the victim's murderer).
193. 386 F.2d 390, 391 (4th Cir. 1967).
194. Id. at 391.
195. State v. Austin, 686 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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i. First Type of Case: Communicated Withdrawal
The first type of case is one in which the defendant is the first
aggressor but then attempts to withdraw and communicates his
intention to withdraw from further conflict. If the victim persists in
attacking the defendant with attempted lethal force, the defendant
can claim self-defense if he responds with his own lethal force and
kills the victim.19 6
For example, in State v. Slert,97 Kenneth Slert and John Benson
got into an argument in a truck at a hunting campsite.'98 According to
Slert, events then unfolded as follows: Slert first punched Benson a
few times, and Benson then reached for Slert's throat.199 Slert
responded by getting out of the truck and walking fifty yards to his
tent.2100 Benson, however, followed Slert to his tent and began choking
him again, prompting Slert to grab his gun and shoot and kill
Benson.201 After Slert was convicted, he appealed, claiming, inter alia,
that he was denied a fair trial because his attorney failed to request an
instruction regarding "the revival of an aggressor's right to selfdefense" when he attempts to withdraw and communicates that
attempt to the victim.202 The Court of Appeals of Washington agreed
and reversed Slert's conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding
that "Slert's actions clearly communicated to Benson his intention to
withdraw from further conflict." 03
ii. Second Type of Case: Escalation by the Victim
The second type of case is one in which the defendant is the first
aggressor using nonlethal force, the victim escalates the encounter by
attempting lethal force against the defendant, and the defendant, with
no reasonable alternative, responds with lethal force and kills the
victim.20 In Watkins v. State,2 05 one version of events had Bruce
196. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-4(c)(2) (West 2006) ("The justification
described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person
who. .. [o]therwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless ... [i]n good
faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the
assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant
continues or resumes the use of force.").
197. No. 31876-8-II, 2005 WL 1870661 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9,2005).
198. Id. at *1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-4(c)(1) (West 2006) ("The justification
described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person
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Watkins first attacking Kenneth Gardner with non-deadly force
(punches), Gardner responding by grabbing a knife and advancing
upon Watkins, and Watkins taking the knife from Gardner and
stabbing him to death.2 0
At trial, Watkins unsuccessfully "requested an instruction to the
effect that even if he were found to be the initial aggressor at the
nondeadly level but it was the victim who escalated the fight to the
deadly level, he would still be entitled to invoke the law of selfdefense."" In reversing Watkins's conviction and remanding for a
new trial, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found that such
an instruction should have been given because it was "a correct
statement of the law." 2 08
iii. Comparing These Two Cases with "First Aggressor" Cases
As noted, in a first aggressor case like the Bedford case from the
Introduction, the prosecution uses evidence of the victim's character
for peacefulness circumstantially.209 In effect, the prosecution is
asking the jury to infer from the victim's general character for
peacefulness that he was not the type of person who would have
initiated an attack against the defendant.
In cases like Slert and Watkins, the prosecution might seek to use
similar evidence for a similar purpose. On remand in Slert, the
prosecution might have wanted to call a witness to testify to the
victim's character for peacefulness. By doing so, the prosecution
would be asking the jury to infer from the victim's character for
peacefulness that he was not the type of person who would have
responded to a few punches by pursuing the retreating defendant fifty
yards and attempting to choke him to death. On remand in Watkins,
the prosecution similarly might have wanted to call a witness to testify
to the victim's character for peacefulness. Again, the prosecution's
goal with this testimony would be for the jury to infer that the victim

who ... [o]therwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless ... [s]uch

force is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger
other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the
assailant.
205. 555 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
206. Id. at 1088.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Commonwealth v. Bedford, 50 A.3d 707, 709-10 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal
denied, 57 A.3d 65 (Pa. 2012).
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was not the type of person who would respond to a few punches by
grabbing a knife and advancing upon the defendant.
Under the plain language of Rule 404(a)(2)(C), however, the
prosecution in Slert and Watkins would not have been able to present
this character testimony because the defendants claimed self-defense
but not that their victims were the first aggressors.210 Unless the
prosecution in Bedford had a meaningfully greater need for evidence
of the alleged victim's character for peacefulness than the prosecutors
in Slert and Watkins, it is difficult to defend evidentiary need as the
rationale for Rule 404(a)(2)(C).
In fairness, in some first aggressor cases, there could indeed be a
greater evidentiary need. In Watkins, for instance, there were several
eyewitnesses to the fatal stabbing, meaning that there was likely less
evidentiary need for evidence of the victim's character for
peacefulness than there was in Bedford, where there were no
eyewitnesses. But by no means does Rule 404(a)(2)(C) only apply in
first aggressor cases in which there are no eyewitnesses." Moreover,
if we are viewing evidentiary need in terms of the relevance and
probative value of the evidence, it is easy to envision cases in which
evidence of the victim's character is less valuable in a first aggressor
case than in other self-defense cases.2 12 Of course, character testimony
in a self-defense case in which the defendant does not claim that the
210. See State v. Slert, No. 31876-8-lI, 2005 WL 1870661, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 9,
2005); Watkins, 555 A.2d at 1088.
211. For instance, in State v. Williams, No. 96813, 2012 WL 1454159 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 2012), a member of a motorcycle club shot and killed a member of a rival
motorcycle club. Id. at *1, *4. Several members of both clubs testified as eyewitnesses at
trial. Id. at *4-5. Because the defendant claimed that the victim was the first aggressor, the
appellate court found no problem with the admission of evidence concerning the victim's
character for peacefulness, despite the eyewitnesses being able to describe the fatal
incident. See id. at *2 (noting that the member of a motorcycle club testified that the
victim "was a good person"). In Williams, there was undoubtedly less evidentiary need for
evidence of the victim's character than there was in Slert, the non-first aggressor case in
which there were no eyewitnesses to the fatal campsite encounter that ended with the
victim's death. See Slert, 2005 WL 1870661, at *1.
212. In several first aggressor cases, a character witness will testify that the victim was a
peaceful person based upon the simple fact the witness had never seen the victim act
violently. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 671, 617 S.E.2d 1, 18 (2005) (noting
that a character witness testified "that she had never known the victim to be violent").
Such testimony of course has some relevance and probative value, but it is not that
valuable "[blecause behavior depends on stimulus situations." David Ring, Comment,
Rush to Judgment: Criminal Propensity Clothed as Credibility Evidence in the PostProposition 8 Era of California Criminal Law, 15 WHITrIER L. REv. 241, 246 (1994).
Maybe the character witness is correct that the victim was not the type of person to act
violently, or maybe the witness merely had never seen the victim confront a set of stimuli
that would push his particular buttons and cause him to react in a violent manner.
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victim was the first aggressor can similarly be lacking in much
relevance or probative value. But, in the right type of case, such
evidence can be more valuable than usual. Recall the Prtine case in
which the homicide defendant claimed that the victim, Brent Ward,
was the first aggressor, prompting the prosecution to call a character
witness, who testified that in her opinion, the victim was not a violent
person.213 The basis for this testimony was (1) "that she once saw
Ward get punched in the face while at a bar and refuse to fight back"
and (2) "that on another occasion, Ward was slapped in the face and
Ward's only reaction was to turn to his friends and say, '[let's get out
of here.' "214
In deciding whether to admit the character witness's opinion
testimony, the trial judge surely found that the testimony had some
relevance and probative value on the issue of whether Ward was the
first aggressor. But this opinion testimony would have had more
relevance and more probative value in a case like Watkins or Slert, in
which the defendants claimed that their victims responded to their
punches with attempted lethal force. Needless to say, it is likewise
easy to imagine a first aggressor case in which character evidence
concerning the victim is more relevant and probative than in other
types of self-defense cases. The point, though, is that Rule
404(a)(2)(C) per se precludes prosecutors from presenting such
character evidence in non-first aggressor self-defense cases even when
the evidentiary need for such evidence is at its apex.
iv. Fourth Type of Case: Self-Defense Based upon Past Acts by the
Victim
Arguably, that apex is reached in the third principal type of selfdefense case in which the defendant does not claim that the victim
was the first aggressor: the case in which the defendant alleges that he
feared the victim because of the victim's past violent act(s). As an
example, in State v. Copenny,215 Amos Copenny shot and killed the
victim, Bobby Wilson. 216 At trial, Copenny claimed self-defense but
did not allege that Wilson was the first aggressor.2"' Instead, he
213. See Prtine, 784 N.W.2d at 309, 314. .
214. Id. at 314 (alteration in original). As noted, the court found that it was improper
to inquire into the specific instances of peacefulness that formed the basis for the character
witness's opinion. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. That said, judges can and
should evaluate such specific instances when determining whether to admit character
evidence.
215. 888 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
216. Id. at 452.
217. See id. at 455.
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claimed that he was fearful of Wilson based upon a prior incident in
which Wilson attacked him while holding a gun.218
Testifying for the appellant, Aliscia Patillo stated that she and
[Copenny] were at Larry's Lounge about four weeks before the
shooting when [Wilson] came in and told [Copenny], "You and
your bitch can go down." [Wilson] then left and [Copenny]
followed him out the door. Ms. Patillo watched [Copennyl walk
towards his car and saw [Wilson] run past him with a gun. Two
other men surrounded [Copenny] with guns. [Copennyl tried to
get into his car, but [Wilson] began to fight with him. One of
the other men hit [Copenny] in the head with the butt of a
pistol, and the gun discharged.2 19
In response, the prosecution called Lawanda Hughley to testify
that Wilson, the victim, had been a peaceful person. 220 After Copenny
was convicted, he appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court
erred in admitting Hughley's testimony. 221 The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Tennessee agreed, finding that Copenny did not claim
that Wilson was the first aggressor, rendering Hughley's testimony
inadmissible under Tennessee's counterpart to Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(a)(2)(C). 22
Implicit in the court's conclusion was the fact that Patillo's
testimony was not character evidence concerning Wilson's propensity
for violence, which would have allowed for the admission of
Hughley's testimony under Tennessee's counterpart to Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(a)(2)(B). Instead, Copenny presented Patillo's
testimony "to show the 'reasonableness of [his] claim of apprehension
of danger' from the victim." 2 Some courts call the use of such
evidence " 'communicated character' because the defendant is aware
of the victim's violent tendencies and perceives a danger posed by the
victim, regardless of whether the danger is real or not."2 24
Accordingly,

218. Id. at 453-54.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 455.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Many states have the
defense of imperfect self-defense, in which a defendant honestly but unreasonably believes
that he needs to use lethal force against a victim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sepulveda,
55 A.3d 1108, 1124-25 (Pa. 2012). This is an incomplete defense that merely allows a jury
to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter. See id.
224. Miller, 330 S.W.3d at 618.
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[t]his theory does not invoke Rule 404(a)(2) because Rule 404
bars character evidence only when offered to prove conduct in
conformity, i.e., that the victim acted in conformity with his
violent character. Here, the defendant is not trying to prove
that the victim actually is violent; rather, he is proving his own
self-defensive state of mind and the reasonableness of that state
of mind.225
Because evidence such as Patillo's testimony is admissible for
one purpose-to prove Copenny's fear of Wilson-and inadmissible
for another purpose-to prove "once a violent thug, always a violent
thug"-it is susceptible to a limiting instruction informing jurors how
and how not to use the evidence. 226 But given the empirical evidence
on the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions in the character
evidence context, it is likely that jurors (mis)use evidence such as
Patillo's testimony as propensity character evidence regarding the
victim. 227
Given this likelihood, evidence such as Hughley's testimony
would be highly relevant and probative in a "communicated
character" case to rebut the jury's likely presumption that the victim
had a propensity to act violently. Moreover, in such cases, the
prosecution might very well like to prove that the victim did not in
fact commit the prior act(s) of violence, such as the gun incident in
Copenny. Again, evidence such as Hughley's testimony would be
highly relevant and probative to prove that the victim was not the
type of person who would commit the claimed act(s) of violence. And
yet, as was the case in Copenny, the prosecution cannot present such
evidence because the defendant in a "communicated character" case
does not claim that the victim was the first aggressor. This again cuts
against the argument that Rule 404(a)(2)(C) can be validated on
grounds of evidentiary need.
e.

The Dying Declaration Exception Applies in Civil and
Criminal Cases
Fifth, when the Advisory Committee recognized that the dying
declaration exception is based in large part upon the "exceptional
225. Id. at 618-19.
226. See FED. R. EVID. 105 ("If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a
party or for a purpose-but not against another party or for another purpose--the court,
on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.").
227. See Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to DisregardInadmissible Evidence: A Legal
ExplanationDoes Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 419-20, 422 (1995).
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need for the evidence," it accordingly realized that the exception
could not be limited to criminal cases. The Advisory Committee
specifically noted that "[wlhile the common law exception no doubt
originated as a result of the exceptional need for the evidence in
homicide cases, the theory of admissibility applies equally in civil
cases."22 8 Therefore, dying declarations are now admissible in civil
cases, such as wrongful death actions.
Conversely, Rule 404(a)(2)(C) only applies in criminal trials,
which makes no sense if the rationale for the Rule is evidentiary
need. Assume that Defendant allegedly kills Victim, the prosecution
charges Defendant with murder, and Victim's family brings a civil
wrongful death action against Defendant. If Defendant claims that
Victim was the first aggressor at both trials, the prosecution will be
able to present evidence of Victim's character for peacefulness at the
criminal trial, but the family will not be able to present the same
evidence at the civil trial.2 30 If evidentiary need is the rationale for
Rule 404(a)(2)(C), the disparate operation of the Rule in these two
cases makes no sense because the family in the wrongful death trial
has just as much need for the evidence as the prosecution in the
murder trial. 231
Moreover, recall the rationales given by the Advisory Committee
for limiting Rule 404(a)(2) to criminal trials and precluding its
application to quasi-criminal cases like the family's wrongful death
action against Defendant. According to the Committee, the Rule is in
place "because the accused, whose liberty is at stake, may need 'a
counterweight against the strong investigative and prosecutorial
resources of the government.' "232 These rationales render the Rule's
limitation to criminal homicide cases nonsensical. In the second case
above, the civil wrongful death action, merely the defendant's wallet
228. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note.
229. See, e.g., Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford
World, 71 Mo. L. REV. 285, 304 (2006) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence . .. now apply
the rule to civil wrongful death cases as well as criminal homicide cases . ....
230. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
231. It could be argued that the reason for the limitation is that civil defendants cannot
present character evidence, so a rule allowing civil plaintiffs to admit such evidence in
wrongful death cases would be inequitable. But if Rule 404 were amended to allow civil
plaintiffs in wrongful death actions to present evidence of the victim's character, there is
no reason why the rule could not also be amended to allow civil defendants to rebut such
evidence. A counterargument to this argument would be that prosecutors have a greater
need for such evidence than civil plaintiffs because of the higher burden of proof that they
must overcome (beyond a reasonable doubt vs. by a preponderance of the evidence).
232. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment (quoting
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 82, at 264-65).
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and not his liberty is at stake, and the defendant does not face "the
strong investigative and prosecutorial resources of the government,"
but instead whatever resources the family of the victim can muster. 233
It thus defies logic that Rule 404(a)(2)(C) applies in criminal, but not
civil, cases if evidentiary need is the rationale for the Rule.
III. RULE 404(A)(2)(C) IS INCONSISTENT WITH AN EVIDENTIARY
SCHEME THAT ALMOST ALWAYS TREATS CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
AS WELL AS, AND USUALLY BETTER THAN, THEIR CIVIL
COUNTERPARTS
As the last point from the previous Part makes clear, Rule
404(a)(2)(C) places a criminal defendant in a worse position than his
civil counterpart-a civil wrongful death defendant who claims that
the victim was the first aggressor. This arguably makes it different
from any other Federal Rule of Evidence. For mainly the same
reasons cited by the Advisory Committee in connection with the 2006
amendment to Rule 404(a)(2)-the higher stakes and the potentially
higher resource imbalance-criminal defendants are generally treated
at least as well as, and usually better than, their civil counterparts
under the Rules of Evidence.2 34 This is apparent when considering the
way that criminal and civil defendants are treated under both the
Rules of Evidence and constitutional provisions.
A.

FaciallyNeutral Rules of Evidence
Articles 1,235 V, 23 6 IX, 23 7 X, 238 and XI, 23 9 some of Article IV, 24 0 and
most of Articles VI,241 VII, 242 and V111 24 3 of the Federal Rules of
233. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) (noting that one
"reason for treating civil and criminal cases differently is that 'the stakes are higher' in
criminal cases, where liberty or even life may be at stake, and where the government's
'sole interest is to convict' " (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1976))).
235. See FED. R. EvID. 101-06.
236. See id. 501-02.
237. See id. 901-03.
238. See id. 1001-08.
239. See id. 1101-03.
240. See id. 401-03, 405-11. Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 treat criminal
defendants the same as civil defendants are treated under Federal Rule of Evidence 415.
See id. 413-415. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 precludes the admission of subsequent
remedial measures by defendants when offered for certain purposes. See id. 407. Several
federal courts have, in unpublished opinions, found that this rule applies in criminal cases
while, other federal courts have implied as much in published opinions. See Colin Miller, I
Need a Remedy: Court of Appeals of Wisconsin Finds Subsequent Remedial Measure Rule
Inapplicable in Criminal Cases, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprofl2009/09/407-criminal--state-v-conleyslip-
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Evidence facially treat criminal defendants no differently from their
civil counterparts. Although these Rules are facially neutral with
regard to civil and criminal defendants, courts often interpret them in
a way that favors criminal defendants. For example, while Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(a) precludes the admission of propensity
character evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in
relevant part that, in a criminal or civil case, character evidence "may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident."2 "
For instance, in a drug cooking prosecution, the prosecutor might
use Rule 404(b) to introduce evidence that the defendant had
previously "cooked" methamphetamine, not to prove his propensity
to cook drugs, but instead to prove that he knew how to cook drugs
and that he thus had the requisite knowledge to commit the crime
charged.2 45 In other cases, a criminal defendant seeks to present
evidence under Rule 404(b) to prove that an alternate suspect was
guilty of the crime charged. As an example, in Stevens v. Stevens,246
the Third Circuit found that the district court erred in precluding the
defendant from having a witness testify that he "was the victim of a
crime [by another individual] which was so similar to the instant
crime that the investigating officers believed that the same individual

had committed both." 24 7
Courts deem such alternate suspect evidence "reverse-404(b)
evidence," and many courts conclude "that a lower standard should
be utilized when evaluating the admissibility of other acts evidence
when offered by the defendant."248 This is because of the recognition
that, "[iln a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to all reasonable
opportunities to present evidence which might tend to create a doubt
as to his guilt."249 Conversely, in a civil case, no court has ever treated

copy-2009-wl-3018121wisapp2009.html. Other state courts have reached similar
conclusions. See id. That said, at least two courts have found that Rule 407 applies in civil
but not criminal cases. See id. There is, however, nothing in the language of Federal Rule
of Evidence 407 or its state counterparts that compels this conclusion.
241. See FED. R. EVID. 601-608, 610-611, 613-615.
242. See id. 701-704(a), 705-706.
243. See id. 801-803(9), 803(11)-807.
244. id. 404(b).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1994).
246. 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991).
247. Id. at 1383.
248. State v. Jolley, 2003 SD 5, $ 12 n.2, 656 N.W.2d 305, 308 n.2 (citing multiple cases).
249. People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Colo. App. 1981).
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a civil defendant more favorably under Rule 404(b) than a civil
plaintiff because the same considerations are not at play. 250
ConstitutionalProvisions That Favor CriminalDefendants
Even when a court does not apply a facially neutral Rule of
Evidence in a way that favors a criminal defendant over his civil
counterpart, constitutional protections often result in preferential
treatment for the criminal defendant. Recall Giles, in which the
Supreme Court found that the defendant did not forfeit his
Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of hearsay
statements regarding domestic abuse made by his wife weeks before
her death, meaning that the statements were improperly admitted.2 51
The wife's statements were admitted under a hearsay exception under
California's Evidence Code and would have been perfectly admissible
against the defendant at a subsequent civil wrongful death trial.2 5 2
This is because the Confrontation Clause only applies in criminal
B.

cases. 253
Moreover, under another provision of the Sixth Amendment, the
Compulsory Process Clause, courts have recognized that criminal, but
not civil, defendants have the constitutional right to present a
defense. 254 Accordingly, a court's application of a rule of evidence to
preclude a criminal defendant from presenting evidence can
constitute a constitutional violation under the Compulsory Process
Clause while the same application would not violate a civil
defendant's constitutional rights.255

250. See, e.g., Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1999); Rivera v. Rivera, 262
F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225 n.15 (D. Kan. 2003).
251. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353,368 (2008).
252. The statements were admitted under California Evidence Code section 1370,
which establishes a hearsay exception for certain out-of-court statements describing the
infliction of physical injury upon the declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify
at trial and the statements are trustworthy. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 846 n.1
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007), vacatedsub nom. Giles, 554 U.S.

353.
253. See, e.g., in re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 373 n.31 (3d Cir. 2004)
("We note that the Confrontation Clause raises some additional issues about admissibility
of such testimony in a criminal case, but those concerns are irrelevant in this civil case.").
254. See, e.g., McCulsion v. Wash. State Attorney Gen.'s Office, No. C06-5329RBL,
2007 WL 1059942, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2007) ("While the Supreme Court has
established a Sixth Amendment right to present a defense in a criminal trial, the Supreme
Court has not extended this right to civil commitment proceedings.").
255. See id.
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Rules of Evidence That FaciallyFavor Criminal Defendants
In other cases, the Rules of Evidence do explicitly treat criminal
defendants more favorably than their civil counterparts. This
subsection will detail each of the various Federal Rules of Evidence
that fall into this category.
For example, under Article II, Federal Rule of Evidence 201
deals with judicial notice, with Rule 201(f) providing that "[i]n a civil
case, the court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as
conclusive. In a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that it
may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive." 5 6 According to
the House Report accompanying Rule 201, the reason for this
distinction was because the Judiciary Committee was "of the view
that mandatory instruction to a jury in a criminal case to accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed is inappropriate because
contrary to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." 57
Under Article III, Federal Rules of Evidence 301 and 302 deal
with presumptions in civil cases, including mandatory presumptions
that shift the burden of production or the burden of persuasion to the
civil defendant.2 58 Conversely, proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
303 provided in relevant part that "[t]he judge is not authorized to
direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused."" And
while the Committee on the Judiciary ultimately decided "not to deal
with the question of presumptions in criminal cases" by not enacting
Rule 303,26 "several states, following the example set forth in
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 303, have enacted Rules of
Evidence which expressly prohibit the use of all mandatory
presumptions in the criminal context, both those that shift the burden
of persuasion and those that shift the burden of production" to the
criminal defendant.2 6 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court consistently has
found that mandatory presumptions against criminal defendants are
C.

unconstitutional. 26 2
As noted, under Article IV, Rules 404(a)(2)(A) and (B) treat
criminal defendants more favorably than civil defendants under the
256. FED. R. EVID. 201(f).
257. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 7 (1973).
258. See FED. R. EvID. 301-02.
259. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 3:21 (3d ed. 2007).
260. FED. R. EVID. 301 advisory committee's note.
261. People v. Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315, 322 (Ill. 1998).
262. See Hicks ex rel. Felock v. Felock, 479 U.S. 1305, 1306 (1986) ("The court relied
on this Court's decisions involving the use of mandatory presumptions in criminal
prosecutions.").

1206

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Pandora's Box theory. 263 A civil defendant is precluded from
presenting propensity character evidence, but the "mercy rule" gives
a "special dispensation" to a criminal defendant to present evidence
of his good character and/or the victim's bad character.2 Of course,
those Rules allow the prosecution to counter this evidence with
evidence of the defendant's bad character and/or the victim's good
character. 65 But because Pandora's Box is firmly in the defendant's
hands, he is in a better position than his civil counterpart because he
has the choice of whether to inject propensity character evidence into
his trial.2 66
Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a), the Rape
Shield Rule, civil and criminal defendants are generally precluded
from presenting evidence of the victim's other sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition. 67 In either a civil or a criminal case, however, a
defendant can seek to present such evidence for a permissible
purpose under an exception to the Rape Shield Rule.268 If a criminal
defendant offers such evidence for a permissible purpose, it is
admissible as long as it satisfies the traditional balancing test
prescribed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that
"[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."2 69
Conversely, if a civil defendant offers such evidence for a
permissible purpose, Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2) provides
that it is admissible only "if its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to
any party."270 Moreover, Rule 412(b)(2) states that in a civil case
"[t]he court may admit evidence of a victim's reputation only if the
victim has placed it in controversy. "271
Thus, in addition to placing restrictions on the admission of
reputation evidence in civil cases, Rule 412(b)(2) makes it more
difficult for a civil defendant to admit evidence under an exception to
the Rape Shield Rule in three ways. First, it "raises the threshold for
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A)-(B).
See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
See id 412(b).
Id. 403.
Id. 412(b)(2).
Id.
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admission by requiring that the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweigh the specified dangers." 272 Second, it "shift[s]
the burden to the proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than
making the opponent justify exclusion of the evidence."2 73 Third, it
puts "harm to the victim" "on the scale in addition to prejudice to the
parties." 274 Therefore, the Rape Shield Rule treats criminal
defendants more favorably than civil defendants.
As noted, under Article VI, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d)
allows for the admission of evidence of a juvenile adjudication for
impeachment purposes when such impeachment, inter alia, "is
necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence." 275 By its plain terms,
Rule 609(d) is only applicable "in a criminal case," meaning that
criminal defendants can impeach witnesses for the prosecution while
civil defendants cannot impeach plaintiffs' witnesses.2 76 That said,
while Rule 609(d) was initially crafted based upon Davis v. Alaska to
protect the constitutional rights of the defendant, its drafters
recognized that it could not be a rule (like Rule 404(a)(2)(C)) that
solely benefits one party. Accordingly, "Rule 609(d) also allows the
judge to permit impeachment of a defense witness," meaning that
"Davis v. Alaska acts as a two-way street."2 77
Criminal defendants, however, are still in a better position under
Rule 609(d) than prosecutors because Rule 609(d)(2) per se
precludes the prosecution from impeaching a criminal defendant with
evidence of his juvenile adjudications.2 78 Therefore, criminal
defendants can potentially impeach any witness for the prosecution,
including the alleged victim, while the prosecution can potentially
impeach defense witnesses but not the defendant himself. 27 9 Thus, the
powers granted by Rule 609(d) place criminal defendants in a better
position than both their prosecutors and their civil counterparts.
Furthermore, criminal defendants are in a better position than
their civil counterparts with regard to Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(1), which governs impeachment of witnesses through evidence
272. Id. 412 advisory committee's note.

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. 609(d).

276. Id. 609(d)(1).
277. Col. Francis A. Gilligan, Credibility of Witnesses Under the Military Rules of
Evidence, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 608 (1985).
278. See FED. R. EviD. 609(d)(2) (providing that impeachment through evidence of a
juvenile adjudication is only permissible if "the adjudication was of a witness other than
the defendant").
279. See id.

1208

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

of adult felony convictions not involving dishonest acts or false
statements. Rule 609(a)(1) provides that, for impeachment purposes,
evidence of such a conviction:
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a
criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; and
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a
defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to that defendant.2 80
Thus, when a party seeks to impeach any witness besides a
criminal defendant with evidence of a prior felony conviction not
involving a dishonest act or false statement, the conviction is
admissible as long as it satisfies the liberal Rule 403 balancing test,
under which evidence is admissible unless its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 2 81
Conversely, when the prosecution seeks to impeach a criminal
defendant with evidence of such a conviction, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to affirmatively prove that the probative value of the
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. 28 2
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1990 amendment to Rule
609 explains the reason for this more stringent balancing test applying
to the impeachment of criminal defendants. According to the
Committee,
the Rule recognizes that, in virtually every case in which prior
convictions are used to impeach the testifying defendant, the
defendant faces a unique risk of prejudice-i.e., the danger that
convictions that would be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 404 will
be misused by a jury as propensity evidence despite their
introduction solely for impeachment purposes. Although the
Rule does not forbid all use of convictions to impeach a
defendant, it requires that the government show that the
probative value of convictions as impeachment evidence
outweighs their prejudicial effect.283
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 governs the use of writings to
refresh the recollection of witnesses. 2 84 Rule 612(b) provides that if a
party is using a writing to refresh the recollection of a witness, "an
adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced[,] ... to inspect
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. 609(a)(1).
Id. 609(a)(1)(A).
Id. 609(a)(1)(B).
Id. 609 advisory committee's note to 1990 amendment.
Id. 612.
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it, to cross-examine the witness about it, and to introduce in evidence
any portion that relates to the witness's testimony." 285 In turn, if the
opposing party does not produce the writing, Rule 612(c) states that
"the court may issue any appropriate order."2 6 The Rule then notes,
though, that "if the prosecution does not comply in a criminal case,
the court must strike the witness's testimony or-if justice so
requires-declare a mistrial." 287 Accordingly, if a civil plaintiff
refreshes a witness's recollection and fails to comply with Rule
612(b), the court need not strike the witness's testimony while the
court must do so in a criminal case and must often declare a mistrial,
providing more protections to criminal defendants.
Also, under Article VII, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b)
provides that "[iln a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental
state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or
of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." 288
This Rule has two primary effects. First, it prevents both the
prosecution and the criminal defendant from presenting expert
testimony to prove that the defendant possessed or did not possess
the requisite mens rea to establish a defense or be found guilty of the
crime charged, such as psychiatric testimony that a defendant charged
with first-degree murder acted with premeditation or without
premeditation.2 89 Second, in a case in which a criminal defendant
raises an insanity defense, it prevents a prosecutor or a criminal
defendant from calling an expert witness to testify that the
defendant's mental disease or defect did or did not "prevent the
defendant from appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions." 2 90
This latter effect means that prosecutors and criminal defendants
are treated equally under Rule 704(b) in insanity cases. The Rule
285. Id. 612(b).
286. Id. 612(c).
287. Id. 612(c).
288. Id. 704(b). As the Supreme Court recently noted, there is some variation between
jurisdictions regarding the admissibility of capacity evidence when the defendant's sanity
is at issue. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 758-59 n.30 (2006) (discussing Arizona's
rules for admissibility of such evidence as articulated in State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz.
1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997)). The Court upheld the Arizona trial court's
application of the state's restriction barring "opinion testimony going to mental defect or
disease, and its effect on the cognitive or moral capacities on which sanity depends under
the Arizona rule" against a due process challenge. Id. at 760.
289. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 308 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 230 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13).

290. Clark, 548 U.S. at 758-59 n.30 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 400
(5th Cir. 1999)).
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limits a criminal defendant in proving an insanity defense, but it also
limits the prosecution from disproving such a defense. Because Rule
704(b) equally limits both sides from presenting evidence in a
criminal case, criminal defendants are likely treated equally to their
civil counterparts, who are not governed by Rule 704(b) and who can
admit more evidence but have more evidence admitted against
them.29' It should be noted, however, that in many jurisdictions,
insanity is not a defense in a civil tort suit such as a wrongful death
action,2 92 making the comparison impossible.
The same argument could be made with regard to the first effect.
Under Rule 704(b), a criminal defendant cannot present evidence
that he lacked the mens rea of the crime charged, but the prosecution
also cannot present evidence that he possessed the requisite mens
rea. 293 This could mean that criminal defendants are in no better or
worse position than their civil counterparts who can admit mental
state evidence but also have such evidence admitted against them.
Rule 704(b), however, had an "unintended consequence."29 4
When Congress amended Rule 704 to add Rule 704(b), it "was clearly
focused on the perceived problems of medical experts testifying
regarding legal conclusions, [but] the amendment to the rule was
drafted so that its reach extended beyond mental health experts."2 95
Therefore, "[t]he Rule . . . has been applied to non-medical

testimony, such as law enforcement officers offering expert testimony
as to whether a defendant acted with the intent or knowledge
required to commit the crime charged."" The Rule thus prevents the
prosecution from presenting testimony that police officers "routinely
offered" prior to adoption of the Rule.2 97 Thus, because Rule 704(b)
disproportionately favors criminal defendants, it seemingly places
them in a better position than their civil counterparts.
Additionally, under Article VIII, Rule 803(8) provides an
exception to the Rule against hearsay for
[a] record or statement of a public office if:

291. See, e.g., Yancey v. Carson, Nos. 3:04-CV-556, 3:04-CV-610, 2007 WL 3088232, at
*3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2007) ("Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
applies only to criminal cases, not civil. . . .").
292. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Cole, 934 N.E.2d 16,22 (111. App. Ct. 2010).
293. See supra notes 288, 290 and accompanying text.
294. Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the
FederalRules of Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 191 (2008).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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(A) it sets out:
(i) the office's activities;
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report,
but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by
law-enforcement personnel; or
(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal
case, factual findings from a legally authorized
investigation; and
(B) neither the source of information nor
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.2 98

other

Under Rule 803(8)(A)(ii), then, a police report is potentially
admissible at a civil trial but per se inadmissible at a criminal trial.299
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803 makes clear that Rule
803(8)(A)(ii) is designed to protect criminal defendants more than
their civil counterparts. According to the Committee,
the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police
officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the
defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials
in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the
confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal
cases.300
Meanwhile, under Rule 803(8)(A)(iii) an evaluative report, such
as a certificate of the Director of Prisons, is admissible by both the
plaintiff and the defendant in a civil trial but only admissible by the
defendant in a criminal trial.30 ' This means that civil plaintiffs and
defendants are on equal footing while criminal defendants have an
advantage over their prosecutors and are thus treated more favorably
under the Rule. According to the Advisory Committee, evaluative
reports "are admissible only in civil cases and against the government
in criminal cases in view of the almost certain collision with
confrontation rights which would result from their use against the
accused in a criminal case."3 02
Also, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22) provides an exception to
the Rule against hearsay for evidence of a final judgment of
conviction if four conditions are met, including the condition that
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
See id.
Id. 803 advisory committee's note.
See id. 803(8)(A)(iii).
Id. 803 advisory committee's note.
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"the judgment was against the defendant" if the conviction is "offered
by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other than
impeachment."30 3
Therefore, a civil plaintiff, civil defendant, or criminal defendant
can introduce evidence of a final judgment of conviction for nonimpeachment purposes against any party or witness."* Conversely,
the prosecution can only introduce evidence of a final judgment of
conviction against the defendant and cannot offer such evidence
against any other witness, no matter how much it would advance its
case. According to the Advisory Committee, "[T]he exception does
not include evidence of the conviction of a third person, offered
against the accused in a criminal prosecution to prove any fact
essential to sustain the judgment of conviction" because "[a] contrary
position would seem clearly to violate the right of confrontation.""'
Therefore, Rule 803(22) is another rule that treats criminal
defendants better than their civil counterparts.
Finally, as noted, civil plaintiffs can use the dying declaration
exception contained in Rule 804(b)(2) in any type of case while
prosecutors can only use the exception in homicide cases. 0
Therefore, the Rule is arguably a final rule that treats criminal
defendants more favorably than civil defendants.0 '
Overall, then, under the vast majority of the Rules of Evidence,
criminal defendants are treated as well as, or better than, their civil
counterparts. This, of course, makes sense, given that the criminal
justice system requires that a criminal defendant be presumed
innocent until the prosecution can prove his guilt beyond a
303. Id. 803(22).
304. See id.
305. Id. 803 advisory committee's note.
306. See id. 804(b)(2).
307. Assume that a defendant shoots the victim, and the victim (1) makes a dying
declaration while believing he is about to die, (2) miraculously survives, and (3) is
unavailable for the defendant's trial. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Article VIII: Hearsay, 30
HOUS. L. REV. 897, 1020-21 (1993). At the defendant's criminal trial for attempted
murder, battery, or some other non-homicide offense, the dying declaration would be
inadmissible while the declaration would be admissible at a civil trial for battery or some
similar tort. See id. Because it is usually the prosecution or the plaintiff offering a dying
declaration to incriminate the defendant, Rule 804(b)(2)'s more limited application in
criminal cases provides more protection to criminal defendants. See, e.g., Justice v.
Commonwealth, 108 S.W.2d 1011, 1012 (Ky. 1937) ("[Ulsually it is the commonwealth
that offers the dying declaration...."). Sometimes, however, a criminal defendant does
seek to introduce an exculpatory dying declaration, and there is precedent supporting the
proposition that "[tihe court should be more lenient when the [criminal] defendant wants
the statements in because they are exculpatory." Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281, 1288
(Miss. 1986).
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reasonable doubt. 08 Such an evidentiary structure also coheres with
the oft-repeated notion that it is "better that ninety-nine guilty escape
rather than one innocent man be convicted.""3 Conversely, there is
no similar maxim in the civil justice system.
D. Rules of Evidence That Arguably Treat(ed) CriminalDefendants
Less Favorably
On the other hand, there is only one Federal Rule of Evidence
that used to treat criminal defendants worse than civil defendants,
and there is only one current rule that, like Rule 404(a)(2)(C),
arguably places criminal defendants in a worse position than their
civil counterparts. The rule that used to treat criminal defendants
worse was Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which, prior to 2010,
provided a hearsay exception for a
statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to
render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered
to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.1 o
In other words, if a criminal defendant wanted to introduce a
declarant's statement against penal interest to exculpate himself (e.g.,
by proving that the declarant actually committed the crime charged),
he had to prove that there were "corroborating circumstances clearly
indicatfing] the trustworthiness of the statement." 3 " But if the
prosecution wanted to introduce a declarant's statement against penal
interest to incriminate the criminal defendant (e.g., if the declarant
allegedly committed the crime with the defendant), it did not have to
prove such "corroborating circumstances."3 12

308. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) ("[T]he force of the
presumption of innocence is measured by the force of the showing needed to overcome it,
which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ").
309. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 833 (2d Cir. 1969) (Moore, J., concurring in
the result).
310. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 611 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) (quoting former FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
311. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).
312. See id.
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Recognizing the inequity of this Rule, "[a] number of
courts ... applied the corroborating circumstances requirement to
declarations against penal interest offered by the prosecution, even
though the text of the rule did not so provide."" Ultimately, in
reliance upon these opinions, Rule 804(b)(3) was amended in 2010 so
that any proponent of a statement against interest must support the
statement with corroborating circumstances if the statement "is
offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to

criminal liability." 314
Therefore, under the new Rule 804(b)(3)(B), both the criminal
defendant and the prosecution must prove corroborating
circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of a declarant's
statement against penal interest, regardless of whether the statement
incriminates or exonerates the defendant.315 According to the
Advisory Committee, the change was made because "[a] unitary
approach to declarations against penal interest assures both the
prosecution and the accused that the rule will not be abused and that
only reliable hearsay statements will be admitted under the

exception."3 16
Facially, then, Rule 804(b)(3) currently provides similar levels of
protection to civil and criminal defendants. Under Rule 804(b)(3), it
is more difficult for criminal defendants to admit statements against
penal interest than their civil counterparts, but the Rule also makes it
more difficult for prosecutors to admit such statements while placing
no similar restriction on civil plaintiffs. In practice, however, Rule
804(b)(3) provides more protection to criminal defendants than to
civil defendants because courts frequently find that the prosecution's
introduction of statements against penal interest violates the
Confrontation Clause, which applies in criminal, but not civil, cases.317
The one rule that currently arguably treats criminal defendants
worse than civil defendants is a relatively recent rule: Federal Rule of
Evidence 408(a)(2). 11 Federal Rule of Evidence 408 used to per se
preclude the admission of evidence of conduct or statements made
during compromise/settlement negotiations "to prove or disprove the
313. Id. 804 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment.
314. Id. 804(b)(3).
315. See id. 804(b)(3)(B).
316. See id. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment.
317. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations
Against Penal Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2409,2437-38 (2005)
(noting that Rule 804(b)(3) is the hearsay exception that leads to the most Confrontation
Clause challenges).
318. See FED. R. EvID. 408(a)(2).
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validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior
inconsistent statement or a contradiction. "19 In 2006, however, the
Rule was amended so that it now precludes the admission of such
evidence for such purposes "except when offered in a criminal case
and when the negotiations [are] related to a claim by a public office in
the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority."3 20 As with Rules 413 through 415, Rule 408(a)(2) was met
with universal disdain and criticism.32 1
This Rule potentially treats criminal defendants worse than civil
defendants, who can use Rule 408 to preclude the admission of their
incriminatory "[s]tatements made in compromise negotiations of a
claim by a governmental agency."3 2 2 Of course, the flip side of the
coin is also true. If, during such negotiations, an agency official makes
a statement exonerating the defendant or demonstrating the
weakness of the agency's case, Rule 408(a)(1) allows a criminal, but
not a civil, defendant to introduce such evidence.3 23 It seems,
however, that the former scenario is likely to recur more often than
the latter scenario, which is why the Rule arguably favors civil
defendants.
That said, there are several ways for a future criminal defendant
to protect himself under Rule 408(a)(2). First, of course, the
defendant can simply refrain from engaging in such compromise
negotiations. Second, the Advisory Committee Note accompanying
the 2006 amendment indicates that "[tihe individual can seek to
protect against subsequent disclosure through negotiation and
319. See FED. R. EviD. 408(a)(2) (repealed 2006).
320. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2).
321. See Miller, supra note 240 ("This is one of the many reasons (there are others)
why this aspect of the 2006 amendment to Rule 408 was a bad idea and very poorly
reasoned, and why it was opposed in the public comments submitted by literally every
professional and judicial and academic observer other than the United States Department
of Justice-the only party in the nation which benefited from the adoption of this
particular provision." (quoting e-mail from Professor James Duane to Evidence Professor
listserv)); see also Email from David P. Leonard, Professor of Law and William M. Rains
Fellow, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y of Comm. on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 9, 2005, 5:53PM), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Evidence%20Comments/04-EV-01 1.pdf
(arguing on behalf of several law professors against some amendments to Rule 408);
Letter from Judge Jack Weinstein, Senior U.S. Dist. Judge, E. Dist. of N.Y., to Jerry E.
Smith, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Nov. 3, 2004), http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Evidence%2OComments/04-EV-002.pdf ("I
am dubious about allowing any conduct or statement made in compromise negotiations to
be used in criminal cases . . . .").
322. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
323. See id. 408(a)(2).
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agreement with the civil regulator or an attorney for the
government."3 24 Third, even without such an agreement, the
defendant can engage in such negotiations with counsel present to
advise him of how to answer (and not answer) certain questions to
avoid incriminating himself. Fourth, the defendant can engage in such
negotiations without counsel present. The Advisory Committee Note
provides that
[s]atements made in compromise negotiations of a claim by a
government agency may be excluded in criminal cases where
the circumstances so warrant under Rule 403. For example, if
an individual was unrepresented at the time the statement was
made in a civil enforcement proceeding, its probative value in a
subsequent criminal case may be minimal. But there is no
absolute exclusion imposed by Rule 408.32
In other words, a future criminal defendant has numerous
options to prevent the application of Rule 408(a)(1). Moreover, if this
future criminal defendant is actually innocent of the crimes charged,
there is a high likelihood that the, statements made by both sides
during compromise negotiations with the governmental agency will
be more helpful than harmful to him.
This can be contrasted with the homicide defendant who claims
that he was acting in self-defense and that the victim was the first
aggressor. Such a defendant does not have the options of a defendant
in a Rule 408(a)(1) case. The only way he can preclude the admission
of evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness is by foregoing
what is likely his only viable defense. Moreover, consider the actually
innocent defendant. That defendant not only has no real choice at
trial but he also had no choice in the events giving rise to his
prosecution. If the victim was in fact the first aggressor who attacked
the defendant with attempted lethal force, the defendant had no
choice but to respond with lethal force and then had no real choice
but to claim self-defense at trial.
In sum, only one prior rule of evidence, former Rule 804(b)(3),
did not treat criminal defendants at least as well as their civil
counterparts, and that Rule was amended to provide a facially
"unitary approach" that now actually favors criminal defendants
given the Confrontation Clause.326 Furthermore, there is only one
other current rule of evidence, Rule 408(a)(2), that arguably does not
324. Id. 408 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 310-17 and accompanying text.
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treat criminal defendants at least as well as civil defendants, and it
was met with universal criticism, just like Rules 413 through 415,
which are unique in giving a power to admit evidence solely to
prosecutors and civil plaintiffs."' Rule 404(a)(2)(C) is thus the only
rule that combines these two aberrational aspects in that it treats civil
defendants better than criminal defendants and rests a power solely in
the hands of the prosecution. And yet, before this Article, this Rule
has not been subjected to criticism despite it being antithetical to the
rationales supporting the "mercy rule" in which it is contained.
CONCLUSION

The main goal of the propensity character evidence proscription
is the prevention of jurors convicting a criminal defendant based upon
his criminal past rather than his criminal present. In deeming
propensity character evidence generally inadmissible, Rule 404
recognizes the danger that jurors will use a party's prior bad acts and
his reputation to conclude, "Once a criminal, always a criminal," or,
in a homicide case, "Once a murderer, always a murderer." The
"mercy rule" strengthens, rather than weakens, these rationales by
allowing criminal defendants facing the loss of liberty, and maybe life,
as well as the strong resources of the prosecution to either (a)
introduce propensity character evidence concerning themselves and
their victims, or (b) refrain from presenting such evidence and
maintain the propensity character evidence proscription.
Rule 404(a)(2)(C), however, is diametrically opposed to the aims
of the propensity character evidence proscription. It vests a singular
power in the prosecution's hands that triggers no new power for the
criminal defendant. It places criminal defendants in a worse position
than their civil counterparts. And finally, it does so in the very type of
case in which a criminal defendant has the most at stake and faces the
largest deployment of prosecutorial resources. Rule 404(a)(2)(C) thus
cannot be defended under the rationales supporting the mercy rule,
and it cannot be defended through analogy to any other evidentiary
rule or principle. Instead, the Rule violates the general understanding
that criminal defendants be treated at least as well as their civil
counterparts. As such, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(C) and its
state counterparts should be repealed.

327. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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